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1.1  The Inequality Issue 
Public opinion and policy have always been influenced by perceptions 
about inequality, and recent research makes it possible to say much more 
about trends in wealth distribution than was the case a decade ago. The 
pioneering work of  Lampman  (1962) and others on twentieth-century 
estate tax returns has been revised and updated by James D. Smith and 
Stephen D. Franklin  (1974), as well  as by  the U.S. Internal Revenue 
Service (1967, 1973, 1976). Robert Gallman  (1969) and Lee Soltow 
(1975)  have  drawn  large  samples  from  the  manuscript  censuses  of 
1850, 1860, and 1870, which contained questions on wealth. Alice Han- 
son Jones (1977a, b) has put together  a composite picture of  the dis- 
tribution of  wealth on the eve of  the American Revolution, drawing on 
a sample of  probate inventories. A host of  other scholars, most of  them 
cited  in  sections  1.2 through  1.4 below,  have  drawn  on probate  and 
property  tax records  to sketch local trends  in wealth  inequality  across 
the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth  centuries. 
Some striking patterns have begun to emerge from these studies. The 
inequality of  American wealthholding is not  an eternal constant. While 
Jeffrey G. Williamson  is professor of  economics at the University  of  Wisconsin, 
Madison. Peter H. Lindert is professor of  economics at the University of  California, 
Davis. 
We  have  benefited greatly  from  comments  and  suggestions  by  Richard  Burk- 
hauser,  Sheldon  Danziger,  Robert  Gallman,  Victor  Goldberg,  James  Henretta, 
Alice  Hanson Jones,  Robert Lampman, Gloria L. Main, Jackson  T. Main, Paul 
Menchik,  Gary B. Nash, and Gerard Warden.  We  are also  grateful  for research 
assistance provided  by  Celeste Gaspari and Roger C. Lister. The responsibility  for 
any remaining  errors is ours. 
9 10  Jeffrey G. Williamson/Peter H. Lindert 
the colonial era was one of relative egalitarianism and stable wealth dis- 
tribution, it was followed by an episode of  steeply rising wealth concen- 
tration lasting for more than a century. By the early twentieth century, 
wealth  concentration had  become as great  in the United  States  as in 
France or Prussia, though still less pronounced than in the United King- 
dom, to judge from some tentative  comparisons of  probate returns. This 
episodic rise in wealth concentration seems to have occurred primarily 
in the antebellum period, with the most dramatic shift towards concen- 
tration apparently centered on the second quarter of  the nineteenth cen- 
tury, a period when wage gaps and skill premia were rising,  and profit 
shares increasing. 
Wealth inequality  declined  in  three  periods.  First,  during the  Civil 
War decade,  while  Northern  wealth  inequality  remained  almost  un- 
changed, Southern inequality was reduced dramatically  by  slave eman- 
cipation. This revolutionary leveling in Southern wealth contrasted with 
and outweighed  the opening of  new inequalities  in wealth  (as well  as 
income)  between  North and South. Second, both wealth  and  earnings 
leveled during the brief World War I episode. The third and last period 
of  declining wealth inequality coincided with the “incomes revolution” 
documented by Kuznets (1953) and proclaimed by Arthur Burns. That 
is, wealth inequality declined between the late 1920s and the mid-twen- 
tieth century. In contrast with  the previous periods of  wealth  leveling, 
the twentieth-century leveling has not been reversed. 
American experience thus suggests confirmation of  Simon Kuznets’s 
hypothesis of  an early rise and later decline in  inequality during long- 
term modern economic growth. There is even a close correspondence in 
the timing of  income and wealth  inequality turning points.  We do not 
yet know whether the rise and fall of  wealth and income inequality were 
of  the same magnitude. It is apparent, however, that  the  inequality of 
wealthholding today resembles what it was on the eve of  the Declaration 
of  Independence. 
Any effective theory of  wealth distribution must deal with these long- 
term changes in concentration over time. The greatest challenge to exist- 
ing  theory,  of  course,  will be the  apparently  episodic shifts  in  wealth 
concentration  at two points in  American  history:  (1  ) the marked rise 
in  wealth  concentration  in the first half  of  the  nineteenth  century  fol- 
lowing what appears to have been two centuries of  long-term  stability; 
(2) the pronounced decline in wealth concentration in the second quar- 
ter  of the  twentieth  century  following  what  appears to  have  been  six 
decades  of  persistent  and  extensive  inequality  with  no  evidence  of 
trend.  Furthermore  and  contrary  to  the  popular  view,  these  episodic 
shifts in  American  wealth  inequality  were  not  merely  the  product  of 
changes in the demographic mix.  Changes in  age composition,  for  ex- 
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inequality.  Thus,  while  life  cycle  may  help to  account  for  inequality 
levels  at points  in  time  it  fails  to offer  an  explanation  for  inequality 
trends over time. Nor have American inequality trends been influenced 
in any important way by changes in the size of  the immigrant population 
stock. 
These are the tentative  findings of  this paper. Before  going further, 
however, two issues must be confronted:  motivation and measurement. 
While some observers  care about  income and wealth  inequality  itself, 
others  appear to  be  more  concerned  about  justice,  opportunity,  and 
social mobility.  Injustice, not inequality, is central to debate over insti- 
tutions  which  foster  discrimination  by  race  or sex.  Immobility,  not 
unequal outcomes, is the central issue to those concerned with the impact 
of genes, inheritance, and other dimensions of  family background. Yet 
information on wealth inequality is central even to debates on economic 
justice, mobility,  and opportunity. To judge  the importance of  discrim- 
inatory rules  or other  barriers  to mobility  in  producing  economic  in- 
equality, it is important to measure wealth gaps between rich and poor. 
If the richest one percent  of  households  has  always  held  only  twenty 
percent more wealth than the poorest one percent, then being born male 
to rich  parents can buy  only a twenty  percent  ticket  at most.  By  con- 
trast, if the richest one percent has always held  a thousand times more 
wealth  than  the poorest  one percent,  then investigating  the extent and 
sources of  injustice and immobility would have far more to recommend 
it. Furthermore, inequality may itself  help foster attitudes  of  contempt 
that exacerbate discrimination and socioeconomic immobility. 
The problems of  measurement are well known and they involve choice 
of time span, income or wealth concept, recipient unit, and the summary 
statistic for computing inequality. As for time span, it seems clear that 
the greatest welfare meaning can be attached to lifetime income from all 
sources, or its  capitalized counterpart-total  personal  wealth-viewed 
from a given age. Such measures better capture material  well-being than 
any one of  those usually  available: annual income, annual earnings, or 
the  stock  of  nonhuman  wealth.  Like  other  researchers,  however,  we 
have been forced to retreat  to less perfect measures. We have analyzed 
the available data on the distribution of  nonhuman net worth alone (in- 
cluding the ownership of  slaves). These data  shed  light  on trends  in 
lifetime inequality in two ways. First, movements in  nonhuman wealth 
inequality are likely to reflect movements in  current property  income if 
the  slope relating  the  average rate  of  return  to the  size  of  household 
wealth does not change significantly over time. Second, wealth inequality 
trends are likely  to  correspond  with  earlier  movements  in  overall  in- 
come inequality if  the marginal propensities to save and rates of  return 
maintain  stable relationships with levels of  income  and wealth, respec- 
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they relate to the inequality  of lifetime income in these indirect  ways, 
and also because wealth distribution data exist from earlier time periods, 
well  before  household  surveys  and  income  tax returns  supplied  esti- 
mates for the distribution of  current inc0me.l 
Ambiguity relating to the population unit  selected  and the summary 
inequality statistic employed  also blurs,  though it does not  totally ob- 
scure, the meaning  of  trends  and  levels  in  wealth  inequality.  Wealth 
is shared  to varying degrees among relatives  and  coresidents,  compli- 
cating the definition of  just who it is that has access to that wealth. The 
“household”  offers a unit of  observation  which is probably as satisfac- 
tory  a resolution  as can be had for the question, Whose wealth  is  it? 
In addition, recent work has shown that the summary inequality statis- 
tic selected  can influence the ranking of  different  distributions  by  he- 
quality.  One distribution  may  look  more  unequal  than  another  by  a 
Gini coefficient measure, just as equal by an entropy measure, and more 
equal by top shareholder percentages  (Atkinson 1970). Behind this di- 
versity  in rankings  of  given  distributions  lie  more basic  differences  in 
what aspects of  inequality we care about most: some observers care most 
about the gap between the richest and the median, which is featured by 
some statistics, and others care most about the gap between the median 
and the poorest, which  is featured by  competing  statistics. We  cannot 
treat this issue at any length here. In order to compare studies of  wealth 
distribution  in different time periods, we shall concentrate on the three 
measures most commonly provided by these studies-the  share of  wealth 
held by the richest one percent of  households, the share held by the rich- 
est ten percent, and the Gini coefficient-with  attention to variance mea- 
sures where decomposition identities are useful.  Our conclusions imply 
a belief that the major changes in wealth inequality revealed by Ameri- 
can history  would be evident regardless of  the inequality statistic em- 
ployed. 
These comments  set  the  stage. Measurement  of  inequality  through 
historicaI time is fraught with problems and thus our paper is long. But 
the exercise is an essential prerequisite to any serious modeling of  long- 
term inequality dynamics in America. 
1.2  In the Beginning: The Distribution of  Wealth in Colonial America 
1.2.1  The American Dream and the Revisionists 
Visiting contemporary observers were unanimous in describing colon- 
ial America as a utopian middle class democracy, where economic op- 
portunities  were abundant and  egalitarian  distributions  the  rule.  After 
his  1764 visit to Boston, Lord Adam Gordon remarked:  “The levelling 
principle  here,  everywhere  operates  strongly  and  takes  the  lead,  and 13  Long-Term Trends in American Wealth Inequality 
everybody has property here, and everybody knows it” (Mereness 19  16, 
pp.449-52).  A  French  visitor,  Brissot de Warville,  viewed Boston  in 
1788 and “saw none of  those livid, wragged wretches that one sees in 
Europe, who, soliciting our compassion at the foot of  the altar, seem to 
bear witness . . . against our inhumanity” (Kulikoff  1971, p.  383). Of 
colonial  Philadelphia,  visitors  pronounced  that  “this  is  the  best  poor 
man’s country in the world”  (Nash 1976a, p. 545). According to early 
America’s most famous foreign observer,  Alexis de Tocqueville, things 
were  pretty  much  the  same  by  the  1830s. Indeed  Tocqueville’s  hope 
coincided with  the American dream  that the New  World  could  some- 
how continue to avoid the classic conflict between growth and inequality, 
a conflict so painfully  obvious in England and on the European conti- 
nent when Tocqueville and his predecessors made their visits to America. 
These early observers thought America was egalitarian by European 
standards,  and  modern  social  historians  have  done nothing  to  upset 
these early impressionistic judgments. The modern quantitative evidence 
is effectively summarized by Allan Kulikoffs  (1971, p. 380) statement 
that “in the seventeenth century wealth in American towns was typically 
less concentrated than in sixteenth-century English towns, where . . . the 
richest tenth owned between half and seven-tenths.’’ 
While comparative levels of  European and American inequality have 
never been seriously debated, there has been lively debate regarding co- 
lonial trends in America. Three competing hypotheses have emerged in 
the literature. Following Jackson T. Main (1976, p. 54), the first thesis 
holds  that a European class  structure  and  highly  concentrated  wealth 
distribution were exported to seventeenth-century America. The frontier 
made short work of  the European model, however, and the Revolution 
eventually ensured its demise. While the first thesis predicts  an egalitar- 
ian trend economy-wide in  the colonial era, that it predicts  as well an 
egalitarian  trend  in  the  older  Eastern  settlements  where  the  English 
model was first imported is not clear. 
In contrast, the second thesis argues that the presence of  the frontier 
made it possible right at the start to achieve a very equal distribution of 
land and thus wealth. But as the readily accessible colonial frontier be- 
came  exhausted,  a  trend  toward  inequality  and  wealth  concentration 
emerged,  which  the  Revolution  served  only  temporarily  to halt.  This 
second thesis has many proponents; for simplicity, we shall label them 
“the revisionists.”  Kenneth Lockridge  (1970,  1972), for example, uses 
his colonial  economic stress theory to describe  increasing wealth  con- 
centration  and  diminished  opportunities  for  accumulation  in  settled 
agrarian coastal regions. Man/land ratios rose, land values shot up rela- 
tive to wages making it increasingly difficult for the landless to purchase 
an acre of  farmland and earn rent, and increased wealth and income in- 
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clusions:  that nonagricultural  opportunities  can  be ignored,  and  that 
young men were reluctant to leave for the frontier. Lockridge is asking 
us to view Eastern settled colonial townships as closed agrarian systems. 
His “crowding” thesis quite naturally predicts inequality as the European 
classic steady state emerged. There is another band of  revisionists who 
share the rising inequality view, but the city is their window on colonial 
America.  Bridenbaugh  (1955),  J.  Main  (1965,  1971),  Henretta 
(1965), Kulikoff  (1971), and Nash  (1976a, 1976b) have argued that 
poverty was on the rise in American cities, and that urban trends were 
toward  propertylessness,  swollen  relief  rolls,  increasing  stratification, 
declining  opportunity  and  general  inequality.  For these  scholars,  in- 
equality trends in Boston, Philadelphia, and New York City are far more 
important than colony-wide performance  or even settled  coastal agrar- 
ian township performance,  because  in  their  view  these  cities were the 
flash points for revolution, political  change, and social reform. It mat- 
ters  little to the urban revisionists  that these towns  were  a  small  and 
sharply declining share of  total colonial population. 
The third thesis is the romantic one, and it is the one we adopt here: 
trends were mixed,  but in  the aggregate colonial inequality  was stable 
at low levels.2 In some cities, inequality was on the rise. These were the 
fast growers who attracted the young adult or the propertyless. In others, 
no rise in inequality can be observed. These were typically slow growers 
who failed to attract the young and propertyless. Some settled  agrarian 
regions exhibited inequality trends, others not. Even frontier settlements 
exhibited some evidence of  rising inequality.The colonial era exhibits a 
lack of  consistent local behavior, in contrast to the century following the 
second or third decade of  the nineteenth century. Indeed, when the New 
England or Middle colonies  are examined  as a whole we believe there 
is no evidence which supports the view of  drifting colonial inequality. 
It appears to us that participants in the “great colonial wealth debate” 
have fallen victims of  the fallacy of  composition. Were there evidence of 
rising inequality in all town and rural communities, the case for aggre- 
gate colonial inequality trends would still not be established, for as we 
shall  see,  populations  may  shift toward  regions  with  both  lower  in- 
equality and more rapid wealth accumulation per capita. These were in 
fact the ingredients of  colonial extensive and intensive frontier develop- 
ment, ingredients absent in the nineteenth-century economy, so that it 
thus was not spared from the inequality produced by  modern economic 
growth. 
1.2.2 
A  Word about Data 
Colonial social historians  have made  great  strides in  establishing  a 
broad  data base documenting wealth  inequality  trends in the Northern 
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colonies. Whether based on tax assessments or probate inventories, these 
wealth distributions can be used as indicators of  income inequality only 
with a solid understanding of  their limitations. Since probate records are 
by far  the best source of  colonial inequality information, what follows is 
primarily directed toward this type of  information. 
Historians can get valuable clues as to the inequality of  property  and 
total income distributions among the living by observing the inequalities 
in the wealth that individuals left upon death. Research into colonial pro- 
bate records has shown clearly that wealth  inequality at death exhibits 
much the same trends (but different levels) as wealth inequality among 
the living where both kinds of documentation are available. This is ap- 
parent in the studies by Jackson T. Main (1976), Gloria Main  (1976), 
Gary Nash (1976a), Alice Jones (1970, l971,1972,1977a, 1977b) and 
others, all of  whom have been able to classify numerous extant colonial 
wealth distributions for decedents by age so as to reweight them to con- 
form to the age distributions of the living (following the estate multiplier 
method, e.g., Mendershausen  1956 and Lampman 1962). In no case do 
the resulting trends  in wealth  inequality among the living depart from 
those based on the deceased. In short, while the first limitation of colo- 
nial wealth probate data is that they fail in theory to describe the living, 
past studies have established unambiguously that adjusting for age dis- 
tribution affects only the levels and not the trends in wealth inequality. 
Some  critics  argue  that extant  colonial  wealth  distributions  fail  to 
gauge income inequality, and that it is this which should be the relevant 
focus.  The critics can  be answered  in  the  following  way:  Wealth  in- 
equality  measures  will  be monotonically  related  to  income  inequality 
measures when  a few innocuous  assumptions  are satisfied. Wealth  in- 
equality levels are monotonically related to inequality in current property 
(human and conventional) incomes if  rates of  return on assets (includ- 
ing consumer durables) vary little across wealth  classes. Even if  rates 
of  return  rise with  size of  wealth holdings,  the  correlation  still  holds; 
parallel inequality trends in property income and property values would 
still be assured in this case, although income inequality levels and trends 
would  be  magnified.  Indeed,  while  twentieth-century  evidence  shows 
that property income is more highly concentrated than wealth, implying 
higher rates of  return among the more wealthy, the temporal correlation 
between the two after 1929 can be established with ease. Compared with 
those of  the twentieth century, colonial wealth distributions are likely to 
exhibit an even closer parallel to total, as opposed to only property, in- 
come  distributions.  After  all,  conventional  property  income  is  a  far 
larger share of total income in early stages of  growth when human capi- 
tal, and thus labor earnings above “subsistence,” is less important. On 
these grounds alone, the distribution of  real estate and mercantile wealth 
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early in America’s growth experience than late. Finally, wealth inequality 
trends will accurately reflect prior income inquality trends if  average pro- 
pensities to save do not decline with income and if  the income slope of 
the  average-propensity-to-save  function  is  relatively  stable  over  time. 
Neither of  these assumptions can be rejected on the basis of  colonial and 
early national data. 
We now turn to another problem in dealing with colonial wealth data. 
Owing to small sample size, probate wealth  distributions, appropriately 
deflated, must be averaged over several years in order to shed light on 
long-term  trends  in  wealth  distributions.  Wealth  inequality  statistics 
drawn from only a year or two are much too sensitive to the timing of 
death among the very rich. In response to this problem, some researchers 
report the full distribution from which has been subtracted the effect of 
the richest few. Although this procedure has been favored by some (e.g., 
J. Main’s  [1976] use  of  the “trimmed  mean”  in Connecticut colonial 
probates), we shall rely instead on multiyear averages. 
TWO  remaining limitations on the probated  wealth distributions  are 
more important than those just mentioned. First, many decedents failed 
to leave wills or to have their estates administered at death. The records 
that survive thus  supply  only  a sample of  all  decedents.  Fortunately, 
these samples are usually large enough to predict population wealth dis- 
tributions. While the samples are not free of  coverage bias, colonial his- 
torians have been impressed at how well represented  are both the very 
poor and the very rich in probate records. To be sure, samples may ex- 
hibit better coverage among estates of  middle and high value, and those 
too poor to leave any wealth  are often seriously underrepresented. Yet 
these problems are hardly intractable, and consistent rules for augment- 
ing colonial probate records  have been well established  (Jones 1977a, 
1977b; J. Main  1976; G. Main  1976; D.  Smith 1975) to correct for 
the coverage bias. The essential point is that probate samples will accu- 
rately  reflect  trends in  wealth  inequality  unless  there were  changes  in 
coverage. 
Second, probate records are limited in their asset and liability  cover- 
age. As a rule, the Middle colonies did not include real estate (land, im- 
provements, and buildings), but covered only personal  estate. The New 
England colonies were more complete in asset coverage. In both cases, 
financial liabilities were rarely included. As we shall see, this variety  in 
asset coverage is a serious defect only  if  comparative judgments  across 
colonies or short-term  instability  is the focus.  The problem  of  limited 
coverage appears  not  to  be quantitatively  significant when  evaluating 
long-run trends, since colonial wealth inequality measures normally trace 
the same secular pattern regardless of  probate asset coverage. 
What, then, do these sources tell us about the distribution of  colonial 
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Colonial Wealth Inequality Trends 
Appendix 1 collects estate and tax list distributions from New England 
and the Middle colonies, producing twenty-nine  series in all. Connecti- 
cut and Massachusetts are both very well represented from the mid-late 
seventeenth century to the Revolutionary War. We have long time series 
on urban and rural areas, and the series yield a wide geographic repre- 
sentation. The Middle colonies are less extensively documented, but even 
in this case we have time series on Philadelphia  and New York City as 
well as Maryland and rural Pennsylvania. The data have two limitations. 
First, they fail  to supply summary  descriptions of  trends  in  aggregate 
performance  for  any  colony  or region, with  the possible  exception  of 
Maryland. While manuscript  censuses for 1860 and  1870 yield returns 
on total personal wealth for America as a whole and the major regions, 
no such aggregates  are  available for the colonial era, with  the  excep- 
tion of  Alice Jones’s benchmark  for  1774 (Jones 1970, 1972, 1977a, 
1977b). This attribute of  colonial wealth  concentration  trends has the 
effect of  producing an inherent upward bias and, as we shall see in sec- 
tion  1.2.3, has produced  erroneous inferences  in  the  recent  literature. 
Second, wealth distributions derived from tax lists must be treated with 
great  caution.  Since  so  much  of  the  revisionist  literature  (Henretta 
1965; Lemon and Nash  1968) was initially  based  on tax lists, it might 
be useful to discuss its limitations before proceeding further. 
Some ten years ago, Henretta (1965) reported steep wealth inequality 
trends for colonial Boston. His pioneering work was based on very im- 
perfect tax  list  data.  He thought  he  observed  a striking  trend  toward 
wealth  concentration,  since the  top  ten  percent  increased  their  share 
from 46.6 percent in  1687 to 63.6 and 64.7 percent in  1771 and  1790 
(table l.A.4, col.  12). Apart from the fact that Gloria Main and Gary 
Nash’s Boston probate  data (table 1.A.3, cols. 8  and 9) now make it 
apparent that the  1680s and ’90s were decades of  atypical low concen- 
tration ratios, the tax data have now been shown to be seriously flawed. 
Gerard Warden’s adjustments (table 1 .A.4, col. 13) suggest a much more 
modest rise from the atypical trough of  the 168Os, from 42.3 to 47.5 per- 
cent between  1681 and  1771. Warden’s  “adjustments”  deal with prob- 
lems  of  undervaluation.  Undervaluation  ratios  varied  greatly  across 
assets  and over  time,  many  assets  escaped  assessment  altogether,  and 
asset mixes varied over time and across wealth classes. Apparently, these 
valuation problems tend to yield a spuriously steep inequality trend for 
Boston. Although  no one to our knowledge  has yet  attempted  similar 
adjustments to the Philadelphia, Chester County  (Pennsylvania), Hing- 
ham (Massachusetts), and New York City tax list wealth distributions, 
they must by inference be treated with equal caution. It is for this reason 
that figures 1.1-1.4  rely almost exclusively on probate data. 18  Jeffrey G. Williamson/Peter H. Lindert 
What do the probate wealth inequality trends tell us? Was the colonial 
era one of  drifting inequality? If  one were to take  1690 or 1700 as a 
base, the wealth inequality series reported in figures 1.1-1.4  would sug- 
gest mixed trends but, on average, a drift toward greater wealth concen- 
tration for the seven or eight decades prior to the Revolution. This char- 
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Fig. 1.1  Colonial  Wealth  Inequality  Trends:  Rural  Massachusetts 
(percent  held by top wealthholders). Source: tables  1.A.5 
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for rural Massachusetts (but not for rural Suffolk County), for Boston 
as well as Portsmouth  (New Hampshire), and for Philadelphia as well 
as  nearby  Chester  County.  It does not  hold  for  Maryland,  however, 
which  exhibits stability from the 1690s onward. New York City is  an- 
c 
t 
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Fig. 1.2  Colonial Wealth Inequality Trends:  Middle Colonies (per- 
cent held  by top wealthholders). Source: table  1.A.8,  cols. 
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other exception since it had a stable wealth  distribution between  1695 
and 1789 (table 1.A.7, col. 25)’ but it is based on tax list data. 
Selection  of  benchmark  dates  is  critical  in  evaluating  colonial  in- 
equality trends. Boston traces out inequality trends only if  the 1690s are 
taken  as a starting point, while  no perceptible trend can  be identified 
when the 1770s are compared with the 1670s or 1730s instead. “Cycles” 
in wealth inequality  are also reported by  Gloria Main for both Boston 
and Suffolk County probates  (table 1  .A.3, cols. 8-10).  Wealth concen- 
tration rose after a trough in the 1680s and ’~OS,  but far higher inequality 
was recorded in the colonial  era beginning in  1650. If  the  1690s were 
years of  atypical economic conditions accounting for unusually low con- 
centration levels, then the case for stability in Boston colonial inequality 
trends would be reinforced. It hardly seems coincidental that New En- 
gland imports were low and declining from 1697 to 1706, high and ris- 
ing from 1707 to 1730, declining again from 1731 to 1746, and rising 
thereafter to 1771.3  These episodes of  “bust” correspond very well with 
periods of  low inequality  in Boston and Suffolk County  (figure 1.3)’ a 
predictable result since extended depression must have produced capital 
losses at the top of  the distribution and thus a leveling in wealth  con- 
centration. Subsequently, the improvement in Boston trade  (and associ- 
ated capital gains) produced  increased wealth  concentration  following 
ca. 1705 and again following ca. 1750. What we may be observing be- 
tween  1700 and 1730 is not a pervasive secular shift in physical  asset 
accumulation at the top of  the wealth  pyramid, but  an uneven  rise  in 
average asset values among the very rich who held mercantile capital in 
relatively  high  proportion.  After  all, real  estate was  far more  equally 
distributed in mercantile Boston than was “portable” personal property 
(Nash  1976a, pp.  552-53),  and  the  latter  included  slaves,  servants, 
currency, bonds, mortgages, book debt, stock in trade, and ships. Short- 
term capital gains and losses must have been more typical for these types 
of  assets than for real estate,  at least for a trading  center like Boston 
which was subjected to the whims of  exogenous world commercial condi- 
tions. Since the very wealthy held non-land-type assets in relatively high 
proportions, their  relative fortunes were  far more sensitive  to  the va- 
garies of  mercantile conditions.  (For a twentieth century example, see 
Robert Lampman’s [  1962, pp. 220-291  discussion of  asset price changes 
and wealth inequality during the 1920s and ’30s.) Thus the “cycles” in 
wealth concentration can be readily associated with Boston’s trade condi- 
tions, and since the 1680s and ’90s were years of  atypically poor trade 
conditions, while the 1670s or 1710s were not, long-term  stability  (or 
decline)  seems the best characterization of  Boston’s  wealth  concentra- 
tion for the whole colonial era. 
Mercantile  centers were not the only colonial areas to exhibit wide 
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and thus the choice of  benchmark  dates plays  a crucial role here too. 
While  wealth  concentration  was  remarkably  stable  after  1710  (table 
1.A.8, col.  27),  the social historian  beginning  his  analysis  with  1675 
would have cited instead evidence of  a slight drift in Maryland inequality 
throughout the colonial era. While Gloria Main's  estimates  (table 1.A.8, 
Fig. 1.3  Colonial  Wealth  Inequality  Trends:  Boston  and  Suffolk 
County (percent held by top wealthholders). Source: tables 
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col. 26) show a modest rise in Maryland wealth inequality from 1675 to 
1690, Menard, Harris,  and Carr (1974, p.  174) have shown that the 
1670s were unusual since a leveling in the wealth distribution had been 
at work for the quarter-century following 1640, at least along the lower 
western Chesapeake shore. This pattern seems to correspond fairly well 
with tobacco fortunes. While American tobacco prices fell sharply up to 
the late 1660’s, they bottomed out thereafter. Furthermore, the tempo- 
rarily low wealth inequality recorded in 1705-9  (table  1.A.8, col. 27) 
also appears to correspond with depressed tobacco  export^.^ The capital- 
gains-and-losses-export-staple  thesis seems to account for Maryland co- 
lonial wealth instability, too. In the 1690s, conditions facing Maryland’s 
key export staple, tobacco, were more typical; therefore, the stable long- 
term  wealth  inequality  levels  from that  benchmark  seem  to  describe 
Maryland’s  colonial inequality experience best. 
Hartford, Connecticut, will  serve as a final example  of  colonial in- 
stability and the benchmark dating problem. Jackson T. Main’s  (1976) 
recent finding of  long-term stability of  wealth distribution for the Hart- 
ford probate district can be seen quite clearly in figure 1.4. Main’s trends 
for Hartford are confirmed by  Bruce Daniels  (1973-74,  pp.  129-31 ). 
Daniels also finds, however, that wealth  inequality was  on the rise  in 
small and medium-sized Connecticut towns after the early 1700s. Daniels 
reports a steep trend in wealth concentration  in Danbury, Waterbury, 
and Windham after 1700, and in the smaller frontier towns in Litchfield 
County after 1740 (table 1.A.2, cols. 5  and 6). But a comparison with 
Main’s data reproduced  in figure  1.4 shows that the contrast between 
rural  and “urban”  Connecticut  experience may  be only  apparent, not 
real.  While  Hartford  personal wealth  inequality  (figure  1.4, series  la 
and  2a)  and total wealth  inequality  (table  1.A.2, col.  4) were  stable 
throughout the eighteenth century, real wealth inequality was not, for it 
rose between  1710 and  1740 or 1750. Since the smaller frontier towns 
had a far larger share of  wealth in real estate (and thus land),5 the rise 
in wealth concentration outside of  the Connecticut trading towns follow- 
ing 1710 seems less anomolous. Indeed, had Daniels extended  his an- 
alysis backward to 1680, he may have discovered stable inequality trends 
in rural Connecticut too. J. Main’s real estate concentration  figures for 
Hartford County (figure 1.4, series  3) show a very striking leveling in 
real wealth distributions from the 1680s to 1710. Had we, like Daniels, 
begun our analysis in  1700 we  would  have observed  a real wealth  in- 
equality drift in Hartford up to 1774. If  instead the analysis starts with 
the 1680s or earlier, no trend in real wealth concentration  can be ob- 
served. By inference, it seems likely that at least some of  the wealth in- 
equality trends  following  1700 noted  by  Daniels in  rural Connecticut 
are spurious.6 L 
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Fig. 1.4  Colonial Wealth Inequality Trends: Hartford, Connecticut 
(percent held by top wealthholders).  Source: table  1  .A.  1, 
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To summarize, among those probate wealth inequality  series that ex- 
tend  backward  before  the  1690s, Worcester  County  (Massachusetts) 
and Philadelphia reveal the minority position: a clear secular drift toward 
inequality for the entire colonial era. Connecticut, Boston, rural Suffolk 
County (Massachusetts), and Maryland represent the majority:  they do 
not reveal inequality trends. If  instead one is content to start the analysis 
with 1700, then a modest drift toward inequality seems to characterize 
these colonial “local histories”  best.  We have tried  to show, however, 
that the 1700  benchmark may impart a spurious upward trend to wealth 
concentration  indices. Some readers  may disagree with  this interpreta- 
tion, but those historians who have adopted the  1700 benchmark,  and 
thus view the mixed “local history” trends as evidence of  a colonial in- 
equality drift, may be inadvertent victims of yet another bias-the  fallacy 
of  composition. 
1.2.3 
New Frontiers, Old Settlements, and 
Colonial Wealth Inequality 
As we have seen, the probate or tax data necessary to document trends 
in colony-wide wealth inequality do not exist. These trends may be in- 
ferred, however, with the help of  some variance properties. Our interest 
is in the concentration of  wealth colony-wide and one such measure is 
the variance statistic: 
The Fallacy of  Composition and the 
Trending Inequality Bias 
2  (wd- F)Z 
P 
where Wi is individual wealth,  is average wealth, and P  is total colo- 
nial population  (or adult males). Similarly, variance in individual wealth 
holdings in any city, township, county or settlement can be denoted by 
uJz.  Consider  two regions,  an  “old  settlement”  (U,  for urban)  and  a 
“new frontier” (R,  for rural). Since the two regions are independent in 
the statistical  sense  (but hardly  independent  in  the economic  sense), 
colony-wide wealth concentration can be decomposed into the weighted 
sum of variance within and between the two regions. Since relative mean 
deviation is the key to inequality trends, we might instead deal with the 
coefficient of  variation  (or its square) : 
UuU2  +  RuR2  +  U(wu -  w)2  +  R(wR  -  @)2 
uz= 
(;)  =  P  w2 
Let I  be this wealth inequality statistic, and call the population  share in 
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Colonial wealth inequality levels were determined  by  four forces:  ( 1 ) 
inequality in settled regions; (2)  inequality at the frontier;  (3) the rela- 
tive average wealth differential between frontier and settled regions; and 
(4) the relative  size of  the settled  region.8 Our interest  is in  colonial 
wealth inequality trends, not levels, so: 
Four forces were driving trends in colonial wealth  concentration:  ( 1  ) 
trending concentration in settled regions;  (2) trending concentration  at 
the frontier; (3) the changing relative size of  the older settlements; and 
(4) the ratio of  per capita wealth  in settled regions to that of  the col- 
onies as a whole. 
There is little conflict among colonial social historians  regarding the 
following two  assertions:  (1) wealth  was more  concentrated  in  older 
seacoast settlements; and (2)  per capita wealth was higher in the older 
seacoast  settlements. Although  we  shall provide  empirical  support  for 
these innocuous assumptions below, for the moment consider their im- 
plications. 
Colonial historians  almost always draw their data from either settled 
urban areas (Boston, Philadelphia, Hartford, New York City) or from 
older eastern townships or counties  (Hingham,  Chester). Yet  our in- 
equality  formula reminds  us that  an upward  drift  in Philadelphia  in- 
equality hardly implies an inequality trend for eastern Pennsylvania. Nor 
does an upward drift in eighteenth century wealth concentration in Bos- 
ton or Suffolk County necessarily  imply an increase for Massachusetts 
Commonwealth as a whole. A shift in population away from the older 
settlements would have a leveling influence, and so too would any trend 26  Jeffrey G.  Williamson/Peter H. Lindert 
which diminished  the average wealth  differential  between  frontier and 
seacoast regions. Even if  we were to agree  (and we do not)  that rising 
inequality was characteristic of  both settled and frontier  regions in the 
colonial era, this  evidence would  hardly  establish  the case for drifting 
inequality in the eighteenth century. On the contrary, if  extensive or in- 
tensive development in colonial areas away from the seaboard was suf- 
ficiently rapid, the opposite could have been the case. 
The foregoing section serves to identify the component sources of  CO- 
lonial inequality trends, but it also offers a tool for estimating otherwise 
unobservable  colony-wide  trends.  All we  require  are benchmark  esti- 
mates for the percent of  population residing in settled regions, estimates 
of  average wealth in both settled and rural regions, and surrogates for 
wealth inequality in both regions. 
Interior Development and the Irrelevance of Boston 
Let us now apply the decomposition formula to New England colo- 
nial  performance.  Four  forces  were  driving  trends  in  New  England 
wealth concentration: ( 1  ) trending inequality in the seaports generally, 
and Boston in particular  (dZs);  (2)  changing patterns of  wealth  con- 
centration in newly settled interior counties and townships  (dIATB)  ; (3) 
the changing relative size of  older seaport settlements like Boston  (du); 
and  (4) the ratio of  per capita wealth in Boston (mB)  to that of  New 
England as a whole (vHTE).D  The first two terms in the decomposition 
formula are simply a  weighted  average  of  inequality  trends  in  Boston 
and in the remainder of  New England. Table 1.1 and appendix 2 supply 
the necessary  information  to  estimate these  weights. In 1774, for  ex- 
ample, the weight attached to Boston inequality trends is .05, while that 
attached to the remainder of  New England is .95. It looks very much as 
if Boston’s wealth inequality  trends were  irrelevant to New  England’s 
experience. Then why all the fuss about Boston? While some may argue 
that Boston was the focus of  political change, Boston’s experience with 
trending  wealth  inequality-falling  after  the  1670s,  rising  after  the 
1680s, stable after the  1710s-tells  us  almost nothing about New En- 
gland experience. In short, even if we were to adopt the atypical 1680s 
as a benchmark,  Boston’s trends  would  grossly  exaggerate  any  alleged 
inequality drift in New England as a whole. 
Turn now to the third term in the decomposition  expression. Accord- 
ing to Gary Nash  and Allan  Kulikoff, Boston’s population  share must 
have  undergone  a  consistent  and  extended decline between  1687 and 
1774;  in contrast with nineteenth-century city growth, the colonial era is 
hardly one of  dynamic urbanization. Indeed, while Boston contained 7.5 
percent of  New England’s population  in  1710, the figure had fallen to 
4.4 percent in 1750 and 2.7 percent in  1771 (table  1.1). We have al- 27  Long-Term Trends in American Wealth Inequality 
Table 1.1  Colonial Population Trends 
New England Colonies 
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(1)  (2)  (3  1  (4) 
Middle  Phila-  New York  (2) +  (3)  +  ( 1  ) 
Year  Colonies  Period  delphia  City  U 
1700  83,200  1700-10  2,450  4,500  .083 
1710  112,300  171  1-20  3,800  5,900  .087 
1720  169,200  1721-30  6,600  7,600  .084 
1730  238,100  173  1-40  8,800  10,100  ,079 
1740  336,700  1741-50  12,000  12,900  .074 
1750  437,600  1751-60  15,700  13,200  .066 
1760  590,200  1761-70  22,100  18,100  .068 
1770  758,500  1771-75  27,900  22,600  .067 
1780  968,300 
Sources: New  England  and  Middle colonies totals are from US. Bureau of  the 
Census (1976, Part 2, p.  1168). The New York City and Philadelphia figures are 
from Nash  (1976, table 4, p.  13). The Boston  figures are from Nash  (1976, table 
4, p. 131, and Kulikoff  (1971, table  V, p. 393). 
ready seen that the distribution of  wealth in the interior was of  far greater 
significance (by a factor of  20 to 1 ) to mid-eighteenth-century  New En- 
gland wealth inequality  trends  than was Boston itself. In addition,  we 
now learn that Boston’s relative decline must have produced  a leveling 
influence in New England as a whole. After all, colonial Boston always 
exhibited higher wealth concentration than the interior. In the 1760s, for 
example, the top 10 percent of  probated wealth holders had 53 percent 
of  the wealth in Boston, while the figure was 38 percent for rural Suffolk 
County, 39 percent for Worcester County, and 40 percent for Hingham. 
The top 30 percent controlled 88 percent of  the (probated) wealth be- 
tween  1740 and 1760, a figure far in excess of  Worcester’s 64 percent, 28  Jeffrey G.  WilliamsodPeter H. Lindert 
rural Suffolk’s 68 percent, and Hingham’s  73 percent. Indeed, the top 
30 percent in Connecticut’s small and medium-sized towns held from 61 
to 69 percent of  total wealth during the same period. 
How important  was  Boston’s  decline  in  contributing  to  an  overall 
egalitarian leveling in New England? Or to put it another way, how im- 
portant was the extensive development in rural New England to wealth 
leveling during the colonial period? The third term in the decomposition 
expression can be estimated,1° and it implies the following: between 1710 
and 1774, the decline of  Boston  (u  fell from .075 to .027) contributed 
to a wealth leveling in New England of  about dZA-E  =  -.07  using weights 
from the  1770s, or dl,,  =  -.13  using  weights  from  the  1680s.  This 
leveling influence is not insignificant when compared with Alice Jones’s 
1774 benchmark  =  1.88 since it implies a 4 to 7 percent reduction 
in aggregate inequality. It seems unlikely that this conclusion would be 
changed  if  the  seacost  urban settlement  was  expanded  to  include  far 
smaller centers like Portsmouth, Hartford, or New Haven, but it is true 
that none of  these underwent anything like Boston’s decline. 
While Boston’s share of  New England’s population declined, the rest 
of New  England  slowly made  good  an initial  disparity  in  per  capita 
wealth levels. Indeed, appendix 2 reveals that Boston’s per capita tax- 
able wealth  (adjusted by Gerard Warden) as a ratio of  New England’s 
per capita physical wealth fell from  1.608 to 1.339 between  1687 and 
1774. These two wealth concepts are, of  course, somewhat different, but 
if the ratio of  taxable to physical wealth was fairly stable over the eigh- 
teenth century, we can safely conclude that rural New England achieved 
more impressive wealth  accumulation  than  did  Boston  and  other  sea- 
coast settlements. This tended to equalize wealth in the region at large. 
By  how  much  did  interior  intensive development  contribute  to  an 
overall colonial leveling? Although the calculation is based on slim evi- 
dence, it would take an enormous error to change our results. The nar- 
rowing of  the wealth per capita gap between Boston  and the remainder 
of New England over the century  1687-1774  served to lower the New 
England wealth inequality statistic by  .025  (1.3% ) if  1771 weights are 
used  and .064 (3.4%) if  1687 weights  are used. The relatively  rapid 
intensive development in Boston’s hinterlands must have contributed sig- 
nificantly to a leveling of  wealth in New England. 
Even  the  most  skeptical  reader  must  agree  that  wealth  inequality 
trends in Boston and other settled coastal regions  mask  New  England 
trends. Our experiments show the following:  ( 1  ) inequality trends out- 
side Boston were far more important to New England colonial inequal- 
ity experience by a factor of  20 to 1; (2) the relative decline of  Boston, 
as rural New England underwent extensive settlement, contributed sig- 
nificantly to a leveling of wealth distribution in the region as a whole; (3) 
the relative decline of Boston, as rural New England underwent intensive 
wealth  accumulation  and  relatively  rapid  economic  development,  also 29  Long-Term Trends in American Wealth Inequality 
contributed to a leveling of  wealth distribution in the region as a whole. 
The present colonial data base makes it impossible to pursue these com- 
ponents of  wealth  inequality in much greater detail. What we  need,  of 
course, is a far more extensive sampling of  wealth records from the early 
eighteenth century  to  serve as a benchmark  with  which  Alice  Jones’s 
1774 observations may be compared. Then our “analysis  of  variance” 
experiment would have far greater legitimacy. Until that time, however, 
the hypothesis must be that rising New England wealth inequality can- 
not be inferred  from mixed  “local”  trends,  but rather that stability  or 
leveling was the case for New England  as a whole prior to the Revo- 
lution. 
Znterior Development and the Doubtful  Relevance of Philadelphia 
In contrast with  Boston,  the main  seaports  in  the Middle colonies, 
Philadelphia  and New York City, both underwent consistent and rapid 
growth between  1710 and  1774. Nevertheless, even Philadelphia-the 
faster growing of  the two-failed  to match  the  rate of  interior  settle- 
ment after 1720 (table 1.1  ). From the 1720s to the Revolutionary War, 
Philadelphia’s population share in the Middle colonies fell from  3.9 to 
3.7 percent. The population  of  New York City and Philadelphia  com- 
bined  fell from 8.4 to 6.7 percent of  the regional  total over  the same 
period. As in New England, wealth was far more heavily concentrated 
in the settled coastal areas than in the interior,ll so that the relative de- 
cline of  these two seaports served to lower wealth inequality in the re- 
gion  as a whole. How important was  the extensive development  in the 
interior of  the Middle colonies as a wealth leveling influence during the 
colonial  period?  Since  New  York  City  and  Philadelphia  population 
shares declined by only 1.7 percent in the half-century  following  1720, 
the leveling influence, though positive, could not have been very great. 
Did inequality trends in Philadelphia  contribute significantly to Mid- 
dle colony trends? Could trending inequality in Philadelphia  have taken 
place simultaneously with  leveling in  the Middle colonies  as a whole? 
Since Philadelphia  is the prime example of  trending probate wealth  in- 
equality cited by Gary Nash, the bifurcation  has special relevance, and 
once again the decomposition formula will prove helpful.  If  we use the 
1770s as a benchmark,  each parameter  in  the  decomposition  formula 
can  be  estimated.12 Thus, we  can decompose  the  (unobserved)  eigh- 
teenth-century wealth inequality trends  of  the Middle colonies into the 
following component parts : 
dZJIC =  (.071)dZp +  (.933)dZNp +  (2.770)d~ 
+ (.  193  )  d(  FP/  ~MC), 
where MC, P, and NP denote, respectively,  Middle colonies, Philadel- 
phia, and non-Philadelphia. 30  Jeffrey G. Williamson/Peter H. Lindert 
In terms of  potential  impact on Middle colony wealth  concentration 
trends, the rate of  extensive development (du) and inequality  trends in 
rural inland settlements  (  dZNp) were clearly most important, while in- 
equality trends in Philadelphia were least important. The actual impact, 
of course, can be determined only by  documentation of  the four trend- 
ing variables on the right-hand  side of  the decomposition  expression. 
Since interior extensive development was a minor force from the 1720s 
to 1775 (du z  -.002),  the actual impact of  extensive development on 
Middle colony inequality  trends  must have  been  minor.  How relevant 
was  Philadelphia’s  trending wealth  inequality  to  Middle  colony  per- 
formance? Between  1700-1 71  5 and  1766-75,  probate  inequality  data 
imply a sharp rise in Philadelphia wealth concentration. Judged by Gary 
Nash’s  trends  and using Alice  Jones’s  1774 Philadelphia  county  esti- 
mates as a base (appendix 2), dZp =  .557.  Philadelphia trends by them- 
selves would have raised Middle colony wealth inequality by .040 (3%). 
Once again, the debate over inequality trends has been based on a city 
whose contribution to overall Middle colony inequality trends was quite 
small. Only if Philadelphia was  representative of  all regions would  the 
attention lavished on her be warranted.  The truth of  the matter is that 
Philadelphia was not typical even of  all seaports in the Middle colonies. 
New York City and Philadelphia had very similar wealth concentration 
in the 1690s. The top  10 percent of  taxpayers claimed 44.5 percent of 
New York‘s taxable wealth in 1695, while they held 46 percent of  Phila- 
delphia’s taxable wealth in 1693. By  1789, New York City had hardly 
changed at all (the top 10 percent of  taxpayers claiming 45 percent  of 
taxable  wealth), while  Philadelphia  had  undergone  the extraordinary 
inequality trends analyzed so well by  Gary Nash  (reaching 72.3 percent 
by  1774). In  short, if  we believe  Philadelphia to be representative of 
seacoast cities, it contributed  very  little to Middle colony wealth  con- 
centration trends. Since there is  evidence that Philadelphia was  an ex- 
treme case of  trending urban inequality, “very little” seems more likely 
to have been “trivial.” Philadelphia inequality experience was indeed of 
doubtful relevance. 
What about the remaining two forces:  (1  ) trending wealth concentra- 
tion in the interior; and  (2) intensive development in the interior? The 
only probate wealth data for the Middle colonies outside of  Philadelphia 
that would supply dZ,,  are Gloria Main’s estimates for Maryland. From 
1700 to 1754 there appears to be a slight decline in Maryland’s wealth 
concentration. Lemon and Nash (using taxable wealth)  and Duane Ball 
(using a very small probate sample) find the opposite trends in Chester 
County between 1693 and 1770. Interior trends are mixed. But note the 
following:  those vast Middle colony  frontier  regions, whose trends  are 
left undocumented,  must  have been  regions  of  relatively  equal  distri- 
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New England and Middle colony wealth study cited in table  1 .A.  1, so 
it seems quite legitimate to make use of  it here. Furthermore, we know 
that over time and with settlement, these frontier New York and Pennsyl- 
vania counties increased in importance. The process must have had an 
important leveling influence in the interior. To judge interior inequality 
trends  by  examining  the  experience  of  a  single  county,  say  Chester 
County, is  to commit the fallacy of  composition once again. All of  this 
suggests to us that to presume anything about interior wealth inequality 
trends would be folly. 
We are left with  only one final potential  source of  alleged  increased 
wealth  concentration  in the Middle colonies. Did Philadelphia increase 
in per capita wealth more rapidly than the Middle colonies in general? 
If  so, then  the  recent  attention devoted  to Philadelphia’s pre-Revolu- 
tionary  inequality trends might be  justified.  If, like Boston, it did not, 
then  Philadelphia’s  performance  tells  us  little  about  Middle  colonial 
inequality. Until such evidence on interior intensive development is made 
available,  colonial  Philadelphia  inequality  trends  remain  of  doubtful 
relevance. 
Age, Wealth, and Selective Migration 
Demographic forces may also have acted to produce a spurious drift 
in colonial wealth inequality. To judge what truly happened to life cycle 
wealth inequality, an effort must be made to hold age distribution  con- 
stant. After all, young adults have far smaller average wealth  holdings 
(table 1.2 and figures 1.5-1.6).  On these grounds alone, if young adults 
are added  to a static  adult population  through  immigration  or natural 
increase, wealth  inequality may rise  even though life cycle  inequalities 
change not at all. The larger the differential in average wealth  levels by 
age, the more potent the effect. In addition, we must consider wealth in- 
equality within age classes. Using 1870 total estate and 1850 real estate 
census data, Lee Soltow  (1975, p. 107) has shown that inequality  was 
high in the age group 20-29,  much lower in the age group 30-39,  and 
fairly stable in subsequent age groups. It is possible that as the share of 
adult  males  in their twenties rose over time, inequality  would  also ap- 
pear to rise when no true inequality trend was present.’:’ 
What is the colonial evidence on wealth and age? We would be satis- 
fied with either of  two kinds of  wealth concentration data: (1) measures 
of  wealth concentration  over time within fairly narrow age classes; (2) 
detailed information on changing age distributions which could be com- 
bined with  our knowledge  of  age profiles  on wealth  means  and  vari- 
ances. Since the colonial data base does not yet fulfill these rigorous de- 
mands, we must be content with Soltow’s 1850 estimates of  wealth dis- 
persion within age ~1asses.l~  What about wealth  by  age class? Does the 
colonial age-wealth  life  cycle trace out a  profile  much  like  mid-nine- 32  Jeffrey G. Williamson/Peter H. Lindert 
teenth and twentieth-century  patterns? Table 1.2, figure 1.5, and figure 
1.6 exhibit an age-wealth profile that is consistent over time and across 
regions.  Whether  late-seventeenth-century  Maryland,  mid-eighteenth- 
century Hartford, or Revolutionary New England, the patterns are very 
similar to twentieth-century  age-wealth profiles. It is  a simple matter, 
therefore, to establish a potential role for demographic forces as a source 
of  measured wealth inequality change in pre-Revolutionary decades. 
The actual role of  demographic forces is far more difficult to isolate. 
Demographic data for the colonial era are very  skimpy, and  the time 
series that are available rarely supply more than three age classes (most 
Table 1.2  Age and Wealth in the Colonies, 1658-1774:  Average Wealth 
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Hartford  Connecticut 
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.383  .264 
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(5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
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I774  I774  England I774 England 1774 
New 
Age Class  Net Worth  Physical  Wealth  Total Wealth  Physical Wealth 
25 and under  .121  381  .184  .197 
26-45  .770  391  .73 1  .732 
46 and over  1.338  1.295  1.270  1.269 
All adult males  1.000  1  .ooo  1  .ooo  1.000 
~  ~~  ~  ~~ 
Sources:  (1  ) : Value  of  total  estate  (excluding  land  and improvements), inven- 
toried at death, lower western shore of  Maryland. Menard, Harris, and Carr (1974, 
table 11, p.  178). (2) and (3): Hartford probate district, personal  wealth  only. J. 
Main  (1976,  table  XI,  p.  84). These  are periods for which  Main’s  samples are 
relatively large.  (4)  : All Connecticut  inventoried  wealth,  including land.  J. Main 
(1976, table XIX, p. 95). (5) and  (6): Middle Colonies,  decedent wealth.  A. H. 
Jones  (1971, table 5). (7) and (8): New  England,  decedent wealth.  A. H. Jones 
(1972, table 4, p.  114). Fig. 1.5  Age and Wealth in the Colonies, 1658-1753.  Key: (I)  Hart- 
ford,  Connecticut,  17  10-14;  (2)  Hartford,  Connecticut, 
1750-54;  (3)  Connecticut, 1700-1753; (4) Maryland, 1658- 
1705. Source: table 1.2. I  I  c  Age  I 
?O  30  40  50  60 
Fig. 1.6  Age  and Wealth  in the  Colonies,  1774. Key:  (1) Middle 
colonies, 1774 (net worth); (2) New England, 1774 (total 
and physical wealth); (3) Middle colonies,  1774 (physical 
wealth). Source: table 1.2. 35  Long-Term Trends in American Wealth Inequality 
commonly, under 16, 16-60,  and over 60). What we have suggests sta- 
bility in colonial age distributions. If  we ignore the Revolutionary  War 
years, when (young) men in the army were undercounted or missed en- 
tirely,  the evidence  suggests  very  little  change in  age  distributions  in 
New Hampshire between 1767 and  1773, in New York between  1712- 
1714 and 1786, or in New Jersey between  1726 and 1745 (US. Bureau 
of the Census  1976, part 2, p.  1170). Indeed,  the age distribution  of‘ 
adult males (free and slave) was not much older or more dispersed even 
in 1860  compared with colonial times.I5 
While  age  distributions  appear to have  been  stable colony-wide  in 
the eighteenth century, and thus would impart no bias in an aggregate in- 
equality index, the same cannot be said for colonial cities and more ur- 
banized eastern settlements. A widening of  inequality may have resulted 
if urban  populations  got  younger.  Rapid  growth  in  Philadelphia,  for 
example, could not have been achieved in the absence of  native emigra- 
tion from the countryside  as well  as a foreign influx. These tended  to 
consist of  younger and, more frequently, single males. Thus, those cities 
enjoying the most rapid growth were likely to have the steepest inequality 
trends, not necessarily  because average ages were lower but rather be- 
cause ages were far more widely  dispersed.  This prediction  of  an up- 
ward inequality  trend  bias  in  the cities is  confirmed  by  Philadelphia’s 
colonial performance, on the one hand, and Boston’s and New York’s, 
on the other. One cannot help but wonder  to what  extent the  rise  in 
Philadelphia’s  “poor,”  documented  by  Gary Nash,  could be explained 
simply  by  the  increased preponderance  of  youth  in  the  city’s  popula- 
tion.IG 
There is  yet another upward bias  in the urban wealth  concentration 
trends. Migration is, by definition, selective. The vast majority of  young 
in-migrants to Boston, New York, and Philadelphia  chose to leave the 
settled countryside  or Europe because they had  better  “opportunities” 
in the eastern seaports. Since they had no land to keep them  at home, 
some (the majority)  joined frontier settlements and became part of in- 
tensive and extensive colonial interior development. A  smaller  number 
migrated to the towns. The point is obvious: while young adults have, 
on average, low wealth  holdings,  the young urban immigrant has even 
lower wealth  holdings. This selective  aspect of  urban  immigration  im- 
parts an upward  bias to urban  inequality  trends beyond  the  bias  im- 
parted by age itse1f.li 
One can only speculate  but  it seems likely  that changing urban  age 
distributions  imparted  an upward  bias to eighteenth-century wealth  in- 
equality trends in  Boston  and Philadelphia.  While the same cannot  be 
said for colony-wide trends, the fact remains that it is  the experience of 
these two cities that has attracted much of  the social historian’s attention. 36  Jeffrey G. Williamson/Peter H. Lindert 
This section has suggested yet another reason  for rejecting trending in- 
equality as a description of  the colonial era. 
1.2.4  Colonial Quiescence 
It could be argued that all the protagonists in the colonial wealth de- 
bate are correct, but none of  them has articulated how local trends re- 
late to trends for the thirteen colonies combined. Urban inequality  did 
rise  in  some cities,  perhaps  supplying  fuel  for  revolution  and  social 
change. Inequality and social stratification did rise to high levels in some 
settled agrarian regions  along the Atlantic coast, especially those from 
which young men were slow to emigrate. Inequality even rose over time 
in some frontier settlements. The important point, however, is that new 
frontiers were being added  at a very rapid  rate.  The opportunities  for 
wealth accumulation were there in the interior, and they were exploited 
assiduously. The result was both extensive and intensive development in 
the interior of  the Northern colonies. Wealth per capita grew there rela- 
tive to the seacoast settlements, thus producing a leveling influence since 
the new settlements were comparatively poor to start with. Total wealth 
and population shifted to the interior as well, and this too had a leveling 
influence since equality was more a frontier attribute. 
The net  effect was  to produce quiescence  in colonial  inequality.  A 
comfortable result, indeed, since per capita wealth and income growth 
was fairly quiescent during the pre-Revolutionary years too. 
1.3  Wealth Concentration in the First Century of  Independence 
1.3.1  The 1774, 1860, and 1870 Benchmarks 
For the century inaugurated by the Declaration of  Independence, we 
now have benchmarks for nation-wide wealth distributions. Alice Han- 
son Jones (1977a) has constructed one set of  estimates for 1774 using 
probate inventories and the estate multiplier method by which the wealth 
distribution  of  the living is  reconstructed  from that of  decedents. Lee 
Soltow (1975) has used large manuscript census samples to derive size 
distributions of  total assets for  1860 and  1870. 
Table 1.3 reports these benchmark  size distributions. Around  1774, 
the top one percent of  free wealthholders in the thirteen colonies held 
12.6 percent of  total assets, while the richest  ten percent  held  a little 
less than half  of  total assets. In 1860, the richest percentile held 29 per- 
cent of  total America  assets, and the richest  decile held  73 percent.ls 
Thus, the top percentile share more than doubled and the top decile in- 
creased its share by half  again of  its previous  level. Among free adult 
males, the Gini coefficient on total assets rises from .632 to .832. Equally 
dramatic surges are implied for the South and non-South separately. 37  Long-Term Trends in American Wealth Inequality 
Table 1.3  Selected Measures of  Wealth Inequality, 1774, 1860, 1870, 
and 1962 
Net Worth  Total Assets 
Percent  Percent  Percent  Percent 
Share  Share  Share  Share 
Held by  Held by  Held by  Held by 
Top 1%  ToplO%  Gini  Top 1%  Top 10%  Gini 
1774  (13 colonies) 
Free households 
Free and slave 
households 
Free adult males 





















All consumer units 
ranked by total 
assets, unad  justed 
All consumer units 
ranked by total 
assets, revised (see 










53.2%  .694 
59.0 
52.5  .688 
58.4 
47.3  .664 



















































Sources and notes:  The  1774 wealth  distributions  are from Alice  Hanson Jones 
(1977, vol. 3, table 8.1). We are grateful to Professor Jones for advice and access 
to unpublished calculations that were useful  as cross-checks to our own computa- 
tions. We also wish  to thank  Roger  C. Lister  for performing  the  1774 computer 
calculations for this and the next  table. The 1860 and 1870 figures are from Lee 
Soltow (1975, pp. 99, 103). The 1962 figures are derived from Projector and Weiss 
(1966, tables 8, A2, A8, A14, and A36). 
The sample sizes on which  these  calculations  are based  follow:  1774, 919  de- 
cedents, of  whom 839 were males and 298 were from the South; 1860, spin sample 38  Jeffrey G. Williamson/Peter  H. Lindert 
The antebellum rise in wealth inequality is evident even if  one includes 
slaves  as  part  of  the  population.  Counting  slaves  both  as  potential 
wealthholders and as wealth has the effect of  raising estimated inequality 
before the Civil War. This follows from the reasonable assumption  that 
slaves had zero assets and net worth. Adding extra “wealthholders” with 
zero wealth  is equivalent to scaling down the share of  the population 
represented by the same number of  top wealthholders. This adjustment 
should be greater for 1774 than for  1860, since the slave share of  the 
population peaked at about 21.4 percent in  1770 and declined to about 
11 percent by  1860. Thus counting slaves as both people and property, 
a defensible procedure, should have raised the inequality measure more 
for 1774 than for 1860. Nevertheless; table 1.3 suggests that this adjust- 
ment has little or no effect on the net rise in  inequality between  these 
two dates. 
Table 1.3 Sources and notes (conf.) 
of  13,696 males, of whom 27.6 percent were from the South; 1870, spin sample of 
9,823 males; 1962, 2,557 consumer units. 
For definitions of net worth, total assets, and the population unit, see the sources 
cited above. It should be remembered that the 1774 and 1860 calculations include 
the asset values of  slaves in the total  assets and net worth of  their  owners. 
The calculations referring to the total population,  free plus slave, include slaves 
as households with zero assets and net worth  as part of  the population.  In these 
calculations, slaves are thus both people and property. Their share of  the 1770 pop- 
ulation  of  households was estimated by  multiplying  both  the total  free and slave 
populations by a proxy for the ratio of  households to population.  This proxy was 
the share of  negroes and mulattoes over sixteen years of  age in Maryland  in  1755 
in the case of  slaves (US. Bureau of  the Census, 1976, chapter Z), and the share 
of  white  males over sixteen in  1790 (ibid.,  series A119-34)  for the free popula- 
tion. Assuming the same ratio of household heads to adults among slaves as among 
the free, and applying the adult-to-population  ratios  to the slave and free popula- 
tions, yield the estimate that slave households were 20.2 percent of  all households 
in 1770, which is applied to 1774. 
Point estimates  (single  values)  are reported  for cases in  which  we judged  the 
range  between  high  and low  estimates  based  on  different  interpolations  within 
wealth  classes to be  sufficiently narrow.  Where  the  range  implied  by  alternative 
methods of  interpolation was wide, we have reported a range of  values. The latter is 
not to be interpreted as indicating true lower and upper bounds, since errors could 
arise from factors other than  just  interpolating  shares  within  the wealth  classes 
supplied  by  the underlying data. 
Our results show lower inequality for 1774 than was reported  by Alice  Hanson 
Jones (1977a) for two reasons. The first is that Professor Jones has concluded that 
her regional weights within the South require revision  so as to reduce the weight 
of  prosperous Charleston to 1 percent of the South, as she will report in her forth- 
coming volume (1977b). We have used her revised regional weights here, and wish 
to thank her for informing us of the revision. The second reason relates to an ap- 
parent slight deviation in our procedures  in constructing the “w*B” weights  used 
to convert the sample of  decedents  to the estimated population  of  living wealth- 
holders. We are checking the computer programs used by Professor Jones and our- 
selves to pinpoint  the discrepancy.  The differences  are  slight  in  any  case,  with 
Professor  Jones’s revised  size  distributions  ( 1977b) resembling  ours much more 
than they resemble those  of  her earlier volume  (1977a). 39  Long-Term Trends in American Wealth Inequality 
The 1774 wealth distribution bears some resemblance to the (revised) 
distribution implied by the Federal Reserve survey for  1962. The share 
held by the richest one percent  was  apparently  a little lower in  1774, 
both among the free and among the free plus slaves. On the other hand, 
the top decile share appears to have been somewhat higher on the eve 
of  the Revolution than it was nearly two centuries later. 
If  the figures in  table  1.3 are allowed  to stand without  adjustment, 
they reveal an epochal rise in wealth  concentration between  1774 and 
I 860. Tocqueville anticipated this trend toward concentration, pointing 
to the rise of  an industrial elite which he feared would destroy the eco- 
nomic foundation of  American egalitarianism : 
I am of  the opinion . . . that the manufacturing aristocracy which is 
growing up under our eyes is one of the harshest that ever existed. . . . 
The friends of  democracy should  keep their  eyes anxiously fixed in 
this direction; for if a permanent inequality of  conditions and aristoc- 
racy. . . penetrates into [America], it may be predicted that this is the 
gate by which they will enter. [Tocqueville 1963 ed., p.  161.1 
Jackson T. Main suspected that Tocqueville’s fear was borne out by sub- 
sequent events,  at least  based  on  his  early  rough  estimates of  wealth 
inequality on the eve of  the Revolution  and Gallman’s  (1969) findings 
for 1860 (J.  Main, 1971). Gallman suspected a rise in wealth inequality 
after 1810, though for different  reasons. Edward Pessen took a similar 
position,  debunking “the  era  of  the  common  man”  with  evidence  of 
rising  wealth  inequality  and  social  stratification  ( 1973). Lee  Soltow 
( 1971b, 1975) has opposed this view, arguing instead  that wealth  in- 
equality remained unchanged  across the nineteenth century. 
Did a marked shift toward wealth concentration really take place? 
1.3.2  Possible Benchmark Biases and Weight Shifts 
There are several ways that the figures in table  1.3 might be judged 
misleading.  The obvious frontal assault is to claim  that  the underlying 
data are simply unreliable. 
Since her  1774 sample consisted of  only 9 19 observations, as against 
the  13,696 observations used by  Lee Soltow for  1860, it is natural  to 
point the finger of  suspicion at Alice Hanson Jones’s estimates.  As far 
as the asset coverage and population  unit  are concerned,  however,  we 
see no clear bias. While the probate inventories she used may well ex- 
clude some financial assets or liabilities, no clear effect on the size distri- 
bution of net worth or  total assets is obvious. Unleased real estate was 
excluded from the inventories outside of  the New England colonies, yet 
Professor Jones supplied the missing real estate values from predictions 
implied by  regressions estimated on the New England observations. As 40  Jeffrey G. Williamson/Peter H. Lindert 
for the population unit, Professor Jones tried to make the basic popula- 
tion that of  all households in  the thirteen colonies by  assuming that a 
large majority of  adult females were not household  heads.  Should one 
wish to compare an all male wealth  distribution  in  1774 with that for 
1860 or 1870, that comparison is also reported in table  1.3, with little 
difference in the implied trend toward concentration. 
The most serious criticism of  the underlying probate data is that they 
cover a biased sample of  the population  of  potential wealthholders. We 
know that only a minority of  decedent  household heads left wills  and 
inventories. We know that the set of  decedents for whom  no inventory 
survives includes people from all wealth classes. We also know that the 
main excluded group is the very poor,  who  left no inventory because 
they left no wealth to appraise. The net effect is likely to be an under- 
sampling that is more serious for the poorest classes, producing  a pro- 
bate sampling bias that could make wealth inequality look misleadingly 
low. Given the extent to which  probate  records  will  remain  a critical 
data base in future historical research, it is important that more detailed 
studies  be  devoted  to  cross-checking  the  probate  inventory  samples 
against other primary data identifying the wealth, occupation, and other 
attributes of  the population from which the probates survive. It is espe- 
cially important to identify  the wealthiest  and most  prominent citizens 
in earlier centuries, in order to quantify the sampling ratio for the rich. 
Such research into probate bias has already begun  (G. Main  1976; D. 
Smith 1975),  but much remains to be done. 
Professor Jones has already performed  sensitivity analyses  to  deter- 
mine the importance of  the probate sampling bias. Her estimates reported 
in table  1.3 are based  on the assumption  that the probate  inventories 
undersampled the poorer wealth classes. In the net worth  size distribu- 
tion, for example, these “w*B - weighted” results are based on an under- 
lying assumption that the bottom net worth decile includes from five to 
eighty times more nonprobated decedents than the top decile, the rela- 
tive ratio varying from region to region. These multipliers are based in 
part on Professor Jones’s own limited cross-checks between the probate 
samples and other source materials,  such as local tax lists. The multi- 
pliers  must,  however, be characterized  as  guesses,  and  guesses  which 
lack  the guidance  of  any  colonial  contemporary  judgments  regarding 
which people were eluding probate. 
Let us consider what kinds of  errors in these probate sampling multi- 
pliers might have led to a serious underestimation  of  wealth inequality 
in  1774. Perhaps the poor have still been  relatively undersampled, de- 
spite Professor Jones’s attempt to scale up their numbers. While this is 
possible, the missing extra poor would  have to be at the very bottom 
of  the wealth  spectrum.  An  alternative  set  of  weights  that  uniformly 
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ter  of  those  probated,  Professor Jones’s  “w*A7  weights,  showed  no 
greater inequality than the preferred “w*B” weights used here. Suppose, 
however, that the undersampled groups are the very rich as well as the 
very poor. While this is also possible, it must be remembered that in this 
era the very wealthy would have had little incentive to hide their wealth 
from probate. There were no estate taxes to avoid, and even the local 
property taxes on the living were light enough to offer little incentive to 
keeping  property  hidden  from  the  probate  appraiser,  or to  transfers 
inter vivos. 
One can also question the reliability  of  the 1860 census returns  un- 
derlying  Lee Soltow’s recent  book.  Perhaps  people  gave  very  casual 
answers to the census takers. In particular, a large number of  them may 
have  reported  zero wealth  in  order to avoid  the bother  of  estimating 
asset value. Fully 38 percent of  free adult males reported property less 
than $100 in the 1860 census sample, but it is hard to tell what share of 
these actually reported zero wealth. At the other end of  the wealth spec- 
trum, one might speculate that the very  rich overstated their  wealth  in 
the  1860 and  1870 censuses,  but  this  is  a hard conjecture  to sustain. 
Again, we know of  no clear bias in the estimates, either for 1774 or for 
1860. 
Another common suspicion relates not to the quality of  the data but 
to the potentially distorting effect of  shifts in demographic weights, such 
as changes in the age distribution or changes in nativity.  Reflecting the 
sophistication with which economists approach measures of  income or 
wealth inequality in the  1970s, many have expressed  the view  that the 
antebellum rise  in wealth  inequality may be a mirage caused by  shifts 
toward an older population  or by shifts in the share of  foreign-born or 
the share living in cities. To address such skepticism, we need to ascer- 
tain whether there was a rise in wealth inequality among people of  given 
age, place of birth, and area of  residence. 
To sort out the contributions  of  such population  group shifts  to the 
apparent rise in wealth inequality between  1774 and 1860, we first per- 
form a  set  of  reweighting  experiments  using  Professor  Jones’s  1774 
data.ln  This involves transforming the weights on the 919 individual ob- 
servations in her sample so as to reflect the age distribution or the rural- 
urban  mix  of  1860, and  recalculating  top  quantile  shares  and  Gini 
coefficients to  see how  much  shift  in  wealth  inequality  is  implied  by 
combining  different  demographic  distributions  with  the  same  within- 
group wealth data. These experiments are summarized jn table 1.4. 
Before concluding that wealth concentration  rose dramatically  in the 
antebellum  era, one must first establish that the rise  was  not  the sole 
result of  a change in the age mix of  the adult population. From section 
1.2 and table  1.7, we  know that average wealth  rose steeply  with  age 
both  in the  colonial  era  and  in  the  mid-nineteenth  century.  We  also 42  Jeffrey G. Williamson/Peter H. Lindert 
know that the age distribution of  adults became more dispersed over the 
century  following  1774. This  evidence  encourages  the intuition  that 
wealth inequality may have remained the same within  age groups,  and 
that the rise in aggregate inequality  was the result  of  population  aging 
alone. Table 1.4 appears to reject this intuition. Application of  the 1860 
age distribution  to the  1774 wealth  data serves  only  to raise  the top 
percentile share of  total assets held by  males from 12.4 percent to  12.9 
percent,  and the top decile  share from 48.7  percent  to 50.1  percent. 
These age effects account for less than 6 percent of  the aggregate trend 
toward wealth concentration. Similarly, the shift from the 1774 age dis- 
tribution20 to the 1962 age distribution explains only a small share of  the 
apparent rise in top quantile shares over the intervening  two centuries. 
It appears that shifts in age distribution were not sufficiently dramatic to 
Table 1.4  Effects of  Changing Group Weights on Measures of Wealth 
Inequality among Nonslaves, 1774 Versus 1860 and 1962 
Net Worth  Total Assets 
Percent  Percent  Percent  Percent 
Share  Share  Share  Share 
Held by  Held by  Held by  Held by 
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.694  12.6% 
.688  12.4 
.715  12.9 
.706  12.7 
.675  11.4 






















Sources and  notes:  The sources are the same as for table  1.3. 
In adjusting the 1774 wealth distribution to reflect the 1860 and 1962 age distribu- 
tions, we use the age group division offered by Professor Jones:  25 and under, 26- 
44, and 45 and over. The 1860 and  1962 distributions were  calculated  from US. 
Bureau of  the Census  (1976, chapter A), with age group interpolations  for 1860. 
The rural sample population for 1774 consisted of  those scoring 9 (most rural) on 
Professor Jones’s regional code. The urban sample consisted of  codes  1 through  3, 
or essentially Boston, Philadelphia, Charleston,  and New York City. 43  Long-Term Trends in American Wealth Inequality 
explain much of,  the aggregate wealth inequality trends for the first cen- 
tury of  independence. 
Urbanization  appears to offer more explanatory power  than  age dis- 
tribution  changes. On the eve of  the Revolution,  as elsewhere in US. 
history, wealth inequality was consistently higher in the cities than in the 
countryside.  To judge  the contribution  of  urbanization  to the  1774- 
1860  trend in concentration, one must quantify the amount of  urbaniza- 
tion  that  occurred.  This  cannot  be  done  in  a  satisfactory  way  since 
Professor Jones used  a rural-urban  code that does not conform  to the 
rural-urban census definitions for 1860.  Within the context of  the present 
1774 reweighting experiment, we can offer  only clues to the importance 
of  the rural-urban  shift. One clue is  that while the urban  top quantile 
shares in  1774 were much higher than similar colony-wide shares, they 
were not so high as the top quantile shares for the total male population 
in  1860. This suggests that  even  if  cities had  engulfed the  entire U.S. 
population by  1860, this movement could not have explained all of the 
observed  rise  in  wealth  inequality.  Another  comparison  points  to the 
same conclusion. Professor Soltow’s 1860 results imply that if  the entire 
colonial free male population had lived on farms in  1774, the Gini CO- 
efficients and top quantile  shares for the total  assets would  have been 
much lower, but still not so low as those observed in  1774. The actual 
shift from rural to urban residence, or from farm to nonfarm, was much 
less over the century than these comparisons presume, of  course. This, 
and evidence offered in section 1.3.5, suggest that the true shift in popu- 
lation toward the cities is unlikely to have accounted for the observed 
rise in aggregate inequality. 
It appears  that  the trend  toward  wealth  concentration  in  the  early 
nineteenth century was no mirage. Mere shifts in age and residence can- 
not account for the massive change in the structure of  American wealth- 
holding. This conclusion is too important to rest solely on the evidence 
presented thus far. We need to perform further tests on the relevance of 
age, residence, and nativity shifts across the nineteenth century. 
I .3.3 
We have argued that shifts in the age distribution had little effect on 
wealth inequality trends in either the colonial period or the first century 
of  independence. Is the same conclusion warranted for the shorter term 
antebellum period or for the nineteenth century as a whole? 
Tables  1.5 and  1.6 report changes in  the U.S. adult age distribution 
between  1830 and  1900. The age distribution  among American  white 
adult males did change markedly between  1830 and  1870, the most dra- 
matic shift occurring in the last two decades. The percent of  white males 
in their twenties declined from 40.6 in 1830 to 36.1 in  1860 and to 34.4 
percent  in  1880. The decline  appears  to  have  been  even  more  pro- 
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Table 1.5  Percent Distribution of  White Adult Males by  Age, 1830-1900 
Age Class 
Census 
Year  20-29  30-39  40-49  50-59  60 +  Total 
1830  40.58  25.14  15.61  9.73 
1840  39.87  26.12  16.16  9.47 
1850  38.10  26.25  17.12  10.15 
1860  36.06  26.96  17.68  10.69 
1870  33.61  25.09  18.79  12.41 
1880  34.41  24.61  17.58  12.43 
1890  32.93  25.79  17.70  12.00 
I900  31.30  25.60  19.06  12.53 






















Males & Females 
Northeast 
Males 








50.99  29.91 
40.75  42.12 
7.47  21.61 
.80  6.36 
36.2  38.0 
39.7  37.6 
24.1  24.3 
~  ~~~~ 
Source:  U.S. Bureau of the Census (1976, pp. 16, 23). 
nounced in Northeastern states; the share of  adults (male and female) 
in the 15-24  age group falls from 51 percent in 1830 to 30 percent in 
1870, a steep decline indeed. The era of  great inequality surge was there- 
fore also one of  pronounced aging in the American adult population. 
Such shifts in the age distribution could have raised or lowered aggre- 
gate inequality. The outcome would depend in part on whether the aging 
of  the adult population raised age dispersion, as in the earlier stages of 
mortality improvement, or lowered it, as in the present stage of  low and 
declining fertility, when the adult population pushes against the modern 
limits of  life expectancy.  Life cycle wealth  patterns imply that greater 
wealth dispersion  would  be  associated  with greater  age  dispersion.  In 
addition, wealth inequality is highest among the youngest adults, and an 
aging of  the adult  population  would  on these  grounds  tend  to reduce 45  Long-Term Trends in American Wealth Inequality 
wealth inequality."  Which effects prevailed? Let us turn first to a crude 
national calculation and then to a firmer one based  on Wisconsin data. 
We can  use Soltow's  data on the  relationship  of  age to real  estate 
wealth in  1850 to calculate one component of  the age effect. Table 1.7 
shows mean wealth and Gini coefficients for different age groups in 1850. 
Ignoring the Ginis within age groups for the moment, let us calculate what 
would have happened to the top decile share of  real estate wealth if all 
age groups held their mean values and the age distribution  shifted  as it 
actually did between  1830 and  1860. If  the age distribution  alone had 
changed, the top 10 percent (the oldest) would have claimed 23.6  per- 
cent, 22.3 percent, and 21.5 percent of  all real estate in 1830, 1860, and 
1880 respectively. Of  course, aging would also affect aggregate real es- 
tate inequality by shifting the adult population to older age groups hav- 
ing  lower  within-group  Gini  coefficients.  This  second  impact  would 
reinforce the presumption that aging after 1830 served to reduce wealth 
inequality. What we know about age effects thus far serves to magnify 
the aggregate wealth inequality trend that requires explanation.22 
Wealth  data currently  exist  which  would  allow  a  more  explicit  ac- 
counting of  these age and life-cycle effects, since the sample underlying 
Soltow's  1975 book yields total estate values by  age, sex, nativity, and 
region. Unfortunately, Professor Soltow was unable to make his 1860 or 
1870 samples available to us, so we settled on a second best  strategy. 
Soltow's  1971 book on Wisconsin wealthholding reports  the 1860 dis- 
tributions for adult males reproduced in table  1.8. If  we hold  the var- 
iance within age classes constant, how would American aggregate wealth 
inequality  have  behaved  between  1830  and  1900  if  the  observed 
changes in the age distribution of  the adult male population  (table 1.5 ) 
had been the only changes taking place? How important was population 
aging  in  producing  a  downward  bias  in  aggregate  wealth  inequality 
trends? The answers are supplied in table 1.9. The Gini coefficient would 
have drifted downward until 1870 while remaining stable thereafter. 
In short,  attention  to age  distribution trends  in  the  antebellum  era 
Table 1.7 
Age  Mean  Gini  Age  Mean  Gini 
Class  Wealth  Coefficient  Class  Wealth  Coefficient 
20-29  $253  .92  50-59  1950  .77 
3  0-3  9  835  .82  60-69  2253  .77 
40-49  1639  .8  1  70 +  2439  .81 
Age and Real Estate Wealth in 1850 
Source:  Soltow (1975, pp. 70 and 107) based on census samples, free males,  aged 
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Table 1.8  Percent Distribution of  Wealth by Class, Males Classified 
by  Age: Wisconsin,  1860 
Total 
Mean  Distri- 
Wealth  bution  Percent Distribution by Age (aij> 
Wealth Class, i  W;  20 +  ,. 






















10,000  + 
Total 
.5  .288 
50.5  .041 
150.0  .062 
250.0  ,049 
350.0  .037 
450.0  .032 
550.0  .034 
650.0  .029 
750.0  .025 
850.0  .024 
950.0  .021 
1,050.0  .027 
1,150.0  .019 
1,250.0  .023 
1,400.0  .032 
1,750.0  ,058 
2,250.0  .046 
2,750.0  .027 
3,500.0  .041 
4,500.0  .023 
7,500.0  .042 
19,642.1  .019 






















































































































Sources and notes:  The underlying data taken from Soltow (1971b, table 6, p.  45). 
The aij are calculated as a percent of  all adult males. Soltow does not report mean 
wealth or total wealth by class, nor has he been able to supply us with the under- 
lying data. Thus, we have assumed the mean wealth by class to be the midpoint  in 
each size class, with  the exception  of  $10,000 and above. The latter  is computed 
as a residual, since Soltow does report the total mean of  $1,486. In the absence of 
the  underlying  data, we have  also assumed  that these class means  apply  to each 
age  group within  the  given class.  Our imperfect data imply  a  Gini  coefficient of 
0.735, while Soltow reports a figure of  0.752. 
hardly suggests that our aggregate inequality indices are mirages. On the 
contrary, they understate the true inequality trends. 
1.3.4  The Foreign-Born Myth 
Perhaps the surge toward wealth inequality was the result of  a rising 
share of  impecunious immigrants in the total population.  A rise in the 
foreign-born  share  could  have  increased  aggregate  wealth  inequality 
without any change in inequality  among persons  classified by nativity. 47  Long-Term Trends in American Wealth Inequality 
Indeed, since immigrants were normally  skewed toward the young male 
categories, one might have thought that immigration would have  pro- 
duced an inequality trend on these age considerations  alone. We  have 
already seen this to be false for the Northeast and for the United  States 
as a whole. 
An increasing foreign-born share could play a role in two ways. First, 
given a gap in average wealth  between  native and foreign  born, a rise 
in the foreign-born share would serve to increase total inequality without 
any increased wealth inequality within either group. Such evidence could 
be grounds for dismissing the study of  American  inequality  experience. 
If the antebellum inequality surge was simply the result of  poverty influx 
from Europe,  it  would  hardly  warrant  detailed  analysis.  And  these 
wealth gaps were large. After standardizing for age, Soltow shows that 
in 1860 in the Northeast, those native Americans born in southern New 
England  or the Middle Atlantic had average wealthholdings more than 
two times those of  male heads born in Germany, almost three times the 
Irish male head, and a little less than double the British male head  (Sol- 
tow  1975, table 6.2, p. 152). Whether due to discrimination,  inability 
to speak English, a relatively poor European environment, or length of 
time in America, the gaps were a fact of  life. To be more precise, for 
free men in their thirties, those native born had average total estates of 
$2,444 in 1860, while those foreign born had only $1,051; native born 
had wealthholding on an average 2.3 times that of  foreign born (Soltow 
1975, table 3.4, p. 77). Second, if the distribution of  wealth was more 
unequal  among  the foreign  born,  their  increased  relative  importance 
would  also produce rising total  inequality. In fact, wealth  was indeed 
more heavily concentrated among the foreign born in midcentury.23 
It seems to us, however, that these two forces could not have had an 
important quantitative impact on the measured aggregate trends. Even if 
the entire population  of  adult males had been  native born in  1820, the 
Table 1.9  Impact of  Changing Age Distributions on Trends in American 
Wealth Concentration, 1830-1900:  Wisconsin 1860 Weights 
Gini Coefficient  Gini Coefficient 
Census  Census 
Year  U.S.  Wisconsin 
1830  .716  1870  .702 
1840  .714  1880  .705 
1850  .710  1890  ,703 
1860  ,707  .735  1900  .698 
Sources  and  notes:  Underlying  age data used  in  the calculation  are taken  from 
tables  1.5  and  1.6.  The U.S.  age distributions  are applied  using  Wisconsin  1860 
“wealth distribution weights.” The procedure assumes the distribution across wealth 
classes within  age groups to be constant. 
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rise in the foreign-born share to its actual values in 1860 or 1870 could 
not account for much of  the observed surge toward inequality. The truth 
of this assertion  can be made most  apparent with the help  of  the in- 
equality algebra introduced in section  1.2: 
dl =  dl~  [  n ($) ‘1 +  dlp [  (1 -  n) ($)  * ] 
W (1 -  n) 
+  d (2)  1 2n [  IN ($) -  I,( 3) 
W(1-n) 
where N  and F refer to native-born and foreign-born males, respectively, 
and n is the native-born share in the total male population. The remain- 
ing notation follows that of  section  1.2, where w  refers to mean wealth 
and Z  is the squared coefficient of variation.  The first two terms in this 
expression measure the contribution to the aggregate inequality surge of 
changing inequality within native-born and foreign-born groups. We view 
these two sources to be far and away the most important, but our posi- 
tion can be substantiated only if  the remaining two sources can be shown 
to have been minor. 
Consider the contribution of the changing variance in between-group 
means, the fourth term in the changing inequality expression.  While  IF 
was slightly larger than IN  in midcentury, wN  exceeded both pp and f 
by a much larger proportion. It follows that if  the relative mean wealth 
position of  the native born rose over time-if  d(vN/W)  were positive- 
then  aggregate inequality would  have been  fostered  as the poorer  im- 
migrant  groups  fell  behind  the  average  accumulation  performance  of 
native. Americans. The evidence, however, fails to support this view. On 
the contrary, the ratio of  the mean value of  real estate belonging to native 
and foreign-born  white  males  (nonfarm)  was  2.12  in  1850, 1.99 in 
1860, and 2.02 in  1870 (Soltow 1975, table 3.3, p. 76). The surge in 
aggregate antebellum wealth inequality cannot be explained by  a rising 
“wealth gap” between native and foreign born, at least not after 1850, 
the first year for which we have data. 
Consider the third term in the changing inequality expression.  What 
was the impact of the fact that the native-born  share was falling and the 
foreign-born  share was rising? We have  already indicated the primary 
way that rising foreign-born shares might have served to increase aggre- 49  Long-Term Trends in American Wealth Inequality 
gate inequality: by increasing the relative importance of  the impecunious, 
thus augmenting inequality. While IN and IF were roughly the same in the 
mid-nineteenth  century, and while wx  exceeded wF,  it is also true that 
(  -  WN)  was negative. Thus, the long expression in brackets following 
dn does not have an unambiguous sign. The fall (rise) in the native (for- 
eign)  born  share  could  have  raised  or lowered  aggregate  inequality 
trends, depending on the initial magnitudes of  mean wealth by  nativity, 
within variance by nativity, and the distribution  of  adult males by  na- 
tivity. 
The issue is an empirical one which will be resolved only when further 
samples from the U.S. 1850, 1860, and  1870 censuses  are drawn, or 
when Professor Soltow’s data are made available. We can speculate on 
the outcome, however, by appeal to a simple experiment. Was wealth in- 
equality among all Americans in midcentury larger than that among na- 
tive Americans? It was, but the differences are trivial. In 1860, the Gini 
coefficient for native born  was .816, while for all  free adult males  the 
figure was .832. The presence of  foreign born in  the American wealth 
distribution served to raise the Gini coefficient by 2 percent, hardly the 
magnitude necessary to account for a significant portion of  the antebel- 
lum inequality surge, especially given that the foreign born were hardly 
absent from America earlier, in  1820, for example. In 1870, the differ- 
ences are even smaller. The Gini coefficient for total  estate values was 
.831 for native born and .833 for all adult males. The presence of  im- 
migrants in  1870 served to raise the Gini measure of  wealth inequality 
by  two-tenths of one percent  (Soltow 1975, pp. 107, 149)! 
In summary, the source of  wealth  inequality  trends  lay  within  the 
native-born and the foreign-born groups. It was not merely a statistical 
mirage  resulting from  the increased preponderence of  foreign born  in 
America,  or from an increased wealth  gap between  native  and foreign 
born. 
1.3.5  The Impact of  Urbanization 
The antebellum wealth inequality trend is not a mirage induced by age 
and nativity forces, but perhaps urbanization accounts for the aggregate 
trend.  Its importance would not be diminished in  this case, unlike  the 
cases of  age and nativity; after all, while  nativity  and age distribution 
changes may be viewed in large part as exogenous variables in American 
antebellum  development,  urbanization  surely  may  not.  In any  case, it 
would be of  some value to sort out the key sources of  the antebellum in- 
equality trend along urban-rural lines, especially given the conventional 
wisdom that urbanization can “account for” the vast majority of  inequal- 
ity trends during early modern growth. 
This line of  inquiry follows in the intellectual tradition stretching from 
Simon Kuznets  (1955) to, most recently, Sherman Robinson  (1976). 50  Jeffrey G. WiNamson/Peter H. Lindert 
Once  again, we  can decompose  aggregate  inequality  trends  into  four 
component parts: 
-  - 
dZ =  dZu [  u (9)  ’1  +  dZR [  (1 -  u) (9)  ’  ] 
w-  w, 
+  d (9)  {2u[  Zu (9)  -  IE (2) 
+ (-5 - ”  ) ]  1 
W(1  -u) 
where the notation follows that of  section 1.2 above. Let us take the last 
term first, the rural-urban  (here, farm-nonfarm)  wealth  gap.  Average 
wealth was higher among farmers than among other Americans. For ex- 
ample, among free adult males in  1860, farmers had total estates which 
averaged $3,166 while nonfarmers averaged only $2,006 (Soltow 1975, 
table 3.4, p. 77). Furthermore, the farmer’s wealth advantage cannot be 
attributed  to his older  average age,  since the same wealth  differential 
appears in all age classes. In addition, the differential did not increase 
over time; the ratio of  farm to total average wealth  among free males 
actually fell from 1.38 in 1850  to 1.27 in 1860, and the trend continues 
until  1870 (Soltow  1975, p. 76). The declining  “wealth  gap”  should 
have generated an egalitarian  drift in America  as a whole.  Obviously, 
we must look elsewhere for the source of  the antebellum surge. 
How about off-farm migration  and the rise of  nonfarm  employment 
(du)? It is true that wealth was far more equally distributed among farm 
families than among nonfarm families in the 1870 census sample drawn 
by  Lee Soltow. Indeed, while the top 10 percent of  farmers owned  59 
percent of  farm wealth, the top 10 percent of  nonfarmers owned 81 per- 
cent of  nonfarm wealth  (Soltow 1975, p.  108). Gallman  (1969, table 
A-1, p. 22) found similar results in the 1860 census. While Baltimore’s 
top  decile claimed  86.8 percent  of  gross  wealth,  in  the  remainder  of 
Maryland the figure was 64.5 percent. Similarly, New Orleans’s top dec- 
ile claimed 82.6 percent while the rural “cotton counties” claimed 58.6 
percent.  It follows  that urbanization  did  serve  to  raise  inequality  in 
America.  In 1820, about  28  percent  of  the  work  force was  nonfarm 
while  the figure was  41 percent  in  1860 (U.S. Bureau  of  the  Census 
1976, part 1, p.  134). The share of  total Northern population  in urban 
areas rose from 9.4 to 25.6 percent over the same period  (table 1.10). 51  Long-Term Trends in American Wealth Inequality 




Year  Urban  Rural  Share 
1790  160  1,809  .081 
1800  245  2,442  .091 
1810  383  3,397  .lo1 
1820  490  4,730  .094 
1830  827  6,327  .I16 
1840  1,382  8,730  .137 











Urban  Rural 
2,788  11,242 
5,050  14,640 
8,150  17,130 
11,568  20,303 
17,684  22,133 









These  arguments  could be quantified  if  Soltow’s  (1975) underlying 
urban-rural or farm-nonfarm wealth distributions for 1860 or 1870 were 
made available. In their  absence,  the Wisconsin  1860 urban and rural 
wealth distributions  reported in table 1.1  1 will have to serve. If  we hold 
the variance within urban and rural areas constant, how would Northern 
aggregate wealth inequality have behaved over the nineteenth century if 
the observed changes in the urban population  share were the only ones 
that had taken place? What was the quantitative impact of  urbanization 
on Northern wealth concentration trends? The results are summarized in 
table 1.12. There we see that the Gini coefficient would have drifted up- 
ward hardly at all between 1790 and 1840, from .740 to .748. Even after 
1840, the impact of  rapid urbanization  in  the Northeast  served to raise 
aggregate inequality  only modestly, from .748 in  1.840 to .771 in  1870, 
a rise of  some 3 percent. In short, while urbanization served to raise in- 
equality in the first three-quarters of  the nineteenth  century, its contribu- 
tion  to the aggregate  inequality  surge  appears  to  have been  relatively 
minor. This again implies that the vast majority of  the antebellum wealth 
inequality surge in America had its source within sectors and regions. To 
judge from  figure  1.7 below,  however,  much  of  the inequality  drama 
must have centered on the cities. 
3.6  When and Where Did Wealth Become More Concentrated? 
Other independent measures of  wealth inequality trends between these 
1774 and 1860 benchmarks  are essential to test the implications of  the 
Jones and Soltow-Gallman  research. 
Gathering data on the estates of  the very richest .031 percent of  U.S. 
families and comparing their aggregate value with rough estimates of  the 
wealth of  the entire nation, Robert Gallman  (1969, table 2) found that 
the share held by this superrich group rose from 6.9 percent  in 1840 to 
7.2-7.6  percent in  1850, and  then  to 14.3-19.1  percent  in  1890. The 52  Jeffrey G. Williamson/Peter H. Lindert 
Table 1.11  Distribution of Wealth by Class, Males 20 and Older, Urban 
and Rural: Wisconsin, 1860 
Mean Wealth ($)  Adult Male Population 
Wealth Class 
($1  Rural  Urban  Rural  Urban 
0-1  .5  .5  55,134  5,707 
1-100  50.5  50.5  6,897  1,320 
100-200  150.0  150.0  9,859  1,520 
200-300  250.0  250.0  8,878  840 
300-400  350.0  350.0  7,191  420 
400-500  450.0  450.0  6,006  400 
500-600  550.0  550.0  6,839  780 
600-700  650.0  650.0  5,784  520 
700-800  750.0  750.0  4,951  240 
800-900  850.0  850.0  4,690  100 
900-1,000  950.0  950.0  3,766  220 
1,000-1,200  1,100.0  1,100.0  8,684  580 
1,200-1,400  1,300.0  1,300.0  7,213  320 
1,400-1,600  1,500.0  1,500.0  5,599  140 
1,600-1,800  1,700.0  1,700.0  4,170  280 
2,000-2,500  2,250.0  2,250.0  7,938  360 
3,000-4,000  3,500.0  3,500.0  7,401  340 
4,000-5,000  4,500.0  4,500.0  4,188  240 
5,000-10,000  7,500.0  7,500.0  6,747  680 
10,000+  19,315.0  38,582.0  2,851  642 
Sources and notes:  The underlying data are taken  from Soltow  (1971b,  pp.  52- 
53).  Soltow does not report mean  wealth or total wealth by class. Thus, we have 
assumed  the mean wealth  by class to be the midpoint  in  each  size class  with the 
exception of  $10,000 and above. The latter is computed as a residual since Soltow 
does  report urban  and state  total  means,  $1,450  and  $1,370  respectively.  In the 
absence of  the underlying  data, calculated  Ginis  from  the  above  data need  not 
necessarily coincide with those reported by Soltow. Soltow reports a statewide Gini 
of  .757,  while we  computed  a value  of  .750.  Urban  refers  to Milwaukee County 
and rural to the remainder of  the state. 
1,800-2,000  1,900.0  1,900.0  3,598  120 
2,500-3,000  2,750.0  2,750.0  5,191  120 
suggestion that inequality between the superrich and the rest of  the na- 
tion rose across the  1840s supplies a valuable clue, even though Gall- 
man’s data do not allow a comparison between middle and low wealth 
shares. 
Lee Soltow reaches the opposite conclusion based on real estate dis- 
tributions in 1850 and  1860. For both  these  years, and for 1870, the 
U.S.  census asked respondents to state the value of  their land and build- 
ings gross of lein. Sampling these returns, Soltow (1975, ch. 4) has found 
no net change in real estate inequality across the 1850s, the top quantile 
shares almost exactly matching the same shares of  total estate in  1860. 
Stability  in the inequality of  real  estate would  surely  limit  inequality 
trends for the 185Os, given that real estate was nearly 60 percent of  the 53  Long-Term Trends in American Wealth Inequality 
Table 1.12  Impact of  Urbanization on Trends in Northern Wealth 
Concentration, 1790-1900:  Wisconsin 1860 Weights 
Gini Coefficient  Gini Coefficient 
Census  Northern  Wis-  Census  Northern  Wis- 
Year  States  consin  Year  States  consin 
1790  .740  1850  .756 
1800  ,742  1860  .763  .750 
1810  .743  1870  .771 
1820  .742  1880  .776 
1830  .745  1890  .785 
1840  .748  1900  .792 
Sources:  Underlying  data used  in the  calculation  are taken  from  the  sources to 
tables  1.5 and  1.11. The urban-rural population  distribution  in  Northern  states is 
applied  using  Wisconsin  1860 “wealth  distribution  weights.”  The  procedure  as- 
sumes the distribution within urban and rural areas to be constant. It also assumes 
the urban-rural  mean  wealth  differentials  to be  constant.  Thus,  only the relative 
weights, or the share urbanized, is allowed to change over time. 
total value of  wealth in 1860. Still, firm conclusions about inequality in 
total estate cannot be reached from the distribution of  real estate alone. 
The remaining time series evidence comes from regions and cities. For 
the late antebellum South, Gavin Wright  (1970) has presented data on 
the inequality of  improved acreage, farm real estate values, farm physical 
wealth  (land, buildings, slaves, implements) ,  and cotton output from the 
Parker-Gallman  farm sample in  cotton  counties. Wright found no net 
inequality trend for the 1850s, though the second and third deciles from 
the top gained noticeably at the expense of  the top decile and the lower 
seventy percent. This result seems to reinforce Soltow’s finding of  no net 
change in real estate concentration for the South (as well as for the na- 
tion) across the 1850s. 
Enough data do exist to construct size distributions for slaveholding 
over a much  longer  antebellum  period.  Soltow’s work  with  the  slave- 
owning data has led to the summary figures shown in table 1.13. Soltow 
himself (1971a) concluded that there was no change in slaveholding in- 
equality among slaveholders. Yet the more relevant measure is one that 
examines inequality among all families, not just slaveholders. As Soltow 
notes, slaveholders were a declining share of all families. Therefore what 
is at most a modest rise in inequality of slaveholding among slaveholders 
after 1830 becomes a pronounced rise in slaveholding inequality among 
all families (table 1.13). Contrary to the findings of  Gavin Wright for 
the cotton South, the entire South shows a rise in the 1850s in slavehold- 
ing inequality,  apparently part of  a longer  term  trend. The years after 
1830, and perhaps even after 1790, exhibit rising inequality in Southern 
slaveholding. 54  Jeffrey G. Williamson/Peter H. Lindert 
Table 1.13 
Region  1790  1830  1850  1860 
Five regions on the Eastern seaboard 
Slaveholders/family  .35  .36  .30  .25 
Slaves  /f amily  2.9  3.5  2.9  2.6 
Share held by top 1  % 
Unequal Slaveholding in the South, 1790-1860 
Slaves per slaveholder  8.3  9.6  9.8  10.2 
Gini coefficient, among slaveholders  .572  .573  .582  .597 
of slaveholders  13.4%  13.0%  14.2%  13.7% 
of families  22.5%  26.7%  27.9%  30.5% 
Four regions  on the Eastern seaboard 
Share held by top 10% 
of families  74.0%  75.2% 
Entire South 
Share held by top 10% 
of families  71.5%  82.3% 
Source  and  notes: Soltow (1971a, tables  1 and 2) draws  on both  official census 
publications and his own sample of  families and slaveholders from the manuscript 
censuses. 
The regions consisted  of  most of  Maryland, the District of  Columbia,  and North 
Carolina, plus parts of  South Carolina. The fifth region added to these was most 
of Virginia, with some property tax returns for 1780 educating the underlying esti- 
mates for Virginia. 
Professor Soltow reported  some of  the assumed class means for classes defined by 
number of  slaves held. We have assumed others using what seem to be comparable 
procedures. 
The remaining antebellum  observations  on wealth  distributions  are 
mainly  from Northeastern  cities.24 The tax and probate data for these 
areas have yielded the top quantile shares displayed in figure 1.7. These 
are a valuable cross-check on the 1774 and 1860 benchmarks, since they 
are derived by different scholars, with possibly different sampling tech- 
niques, and in some cases with different kinds of  data (e.g., tax returns). 
Two striking patterns emerge from figure 1.7. First, it suggests when 
the steepest trend toward concentration set in. The local tax returns from 
Boston and neighboring Hingham show trough observations in the 1810s 
and '20s. The two top quantile shares from this period for New York 
City and Brooklyn are also much lower than that for the 1840s. Each 
series shows steep increases after 1830, as did the Southern slaveholding 
returns (but not the already cited Soltow and Wright results confined to 
the 1850s). Second, rates of  increase in the top decile shares per decade 
seem to average about the same as that derived for total assets among all 
free households in the U.S. between  1774 and 1860 (about 4.6 percent 
per decade as a percent of  the share itself, according to table 1.3 above). 
It appears, therefore,  that the movement  toward  wealth  concentration 55  Long-Term Trends in American Wealth Inequality 
occurred within regions, just  as it seems to have occurred within given 
age groups, among native or  foreign born, and within rural  and urban 
 population^.^^ 
,  Ill 
Fig. 1.7  Dating the Rise in Antebellum Wealth Concentration (per- 
cent  held  by  top wealthholders) : Northeast.  Source:  ap- 
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While no rich empirical feast can be prepared from such scraps, the 
appetizer should certainly stimulate further interest in early-nineteenth- 
century archives. The working hypothesis seems now to be that wealth 
concentration rose over most of  the period  1774-1 860, with especially 
steep increases from the 1820s to the late 1840s. It should also be noted 
that these two or three decades coincide with early industrial  accelera- 
tion, and with a period in which wage gaps between skilled and unskilled 
occupational groups seemed to widen (Lindert and Williamson 1976). 
1.4  The Uneven High Plateau: Civil War to Great Depression 
1.4.1  Time Series Clues 
The seven decades following the Civil War mark a period for which 
wealth inequality remained very high and exhibited  no significant long- 
term trend. This judgment is based on slim evidence, since the period is 
illuminated  statistically  only near its start and finish. The half-century 
between the 1870 census and the onset of  modern estate tax returns- 
begun in 1919 and reported after  1922-3s  an empirical Dark Age for 
wealth distributions.  It need not remain  this way.  Probate records  are 
rich for most of  this pretax era. For the moment, however, we must rely 
on a data base which is less extensive for this half-century than for 1860 
or even 1774. 
The manuscript censuses have allowed Soltow to compare the distribu- 
tion of  total assets in  1860 and  1870. The dominant intervening event 
during the decade was slave emancipation, a massive confiscation from 
the richest strata of  Southern society.  Thus, the net change across the 
1860s was a shift toward more equal wealthholding for the United States 
as a whole, whether we count slaves as part of  the wealthholding popula- 
tion or not. The movement of  top decile shares is shown in table 1.14. 
The leveling within the South was apparently sufficient to outweigh the 
contribution to total U.S. wealth inequality implied by the opening up of 
a new wealth gap between North and South. Within the North, mean- 
while, there was either no change or a slight leveling across the 1860s. 
Table 1.14  Top Decile Shares of  Total Wealth among Adult Males, 1860 
and 1870 (%) 
1860  1870 
Region  Free  All  White  All 
us.  73  74.6-79.0  68  70 
North  68  68  67  67 
South  75  (very high)  70  77 
Sources: Table 1.13 and Soltow (1975, p. 99). 57  Long-Term Trends in American Wealth Inequality 
The next set of  clues is offered by the census year 1890. As we noted 
above, the share of  wealth  held  by  Gallman’s richest  .031 percent  of 
wealthholders rose to 14.3-19.1  percent in  1890, from 7.2-7.6  percent 
at midcentury. The rest of  the Lorenz curve for 1890 has been estimated 
by George K. Holmes (1893). The 1890 census supplied data on farm 
and home ownership in twenty-two states, and Holmes extrapolated this 
sample to the national  distribution.  Furthermore, using  mortgage  debt 
reported in  the census, Holmes was  able to  approximate net  worth  as 
opposed to gross wealth, thus making the distributions more comparable 
to Lampman’s  1922 net  estate benchmark.  Holmes guesstimated  full 
distribution of  wealth from this data base and, by the imaginative use of 
other  information, generated  the  distribution  for  1890 reproduced  in 
table 1.15. 
Holmes’s guesses imply that the top one and ten percent of  American 
families held, respectively, 25.76 and 72.17 percent of  wealth. Interpola- 
tion suggests that the top  1.4 percent  claimed  28.13  percent  of  total 
wealth. By  comparison,  Lampman (1959, table  6, p. 388)  calculated 
that the top 1.4 percent of  families held 29.2 percent of  the total wealth 
in  1922.26  To the extent that comparability holds, wealth concentration 
increased only slightly between 1890 and 1  922.27 
Better estimates of  national wealth distributions around World War I 
are offered by the Federal Trade Commission’s early research. In 1926 
the FTC published the results of  a special survey in which they collected 
433  12 probate estate valuations from twenty-three counties in thirteen 
states plus the District of  Columbia. The survey covered the years 1912- 
23.28  While table  1.16 exploits the FTC data, it should be emphasized 
that  these distributions  relate  to those  dying in  the  sampled  counties, 
and the sample contains only  one major city, Washington, D.C. If  the 
sample had contained a more accurate representation  of  the urban East- 
Table 1.15  Holmes’s Estimated Wealth Distribution 
for American Families in 1890 
Wealth  Number of  Net Worth 
Class  Families (000)  ($000,000) 
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Source:  Holmes  (1893, pp. 591-92). Table 1.16  Distribution of  Wealth from FTC Sampled Estates, 1912 and 1923 
1912  1923 
King  Williamson-Lindert  King  Williamson-Lindert 


































































































































Sources  and  notes: The FTC data is  reported in 69th Cong.,  1st 
Session, Senate Doc. No. 126, National  Wealth and Income  (1926), 
pp. 58-59.  The King estimates are derived from his assumption that 
those not probated had, on average, $100 at death. The Williamson- 
Lindert  estimates  allow  for the  same  average  among  those  not 
probated, but  for a  rise from $97 in  1912 to $103 in  1923, the 
observed rate of  increase in the  Iess-than-$SOO class. In addition, 
numbers  not probated  are estimated  as  a residual from  mortality 
data.  The mortality  statistics are for registered states  reported  in 
the  19th  and  24th  Annual  Reports,  Department  of  Commerce, 
Bureau of  the Census, Mortality Statistics (1918 and 1923). These 
supply a trend  in crude death rates  which  is  then  applied to the 
FTC aggregate estimate of  184,958 for the whole  1912-23  period 
to yield annual estimates for 1912 and 1923. This figure is distrib- 
uted by sex using  1921 Mortality Statistics proportions.  Total po- 
tential  wealthholders  at death  are then  estimated  assuming  25.3 
percent of  deceased females were potential wealthholders. The 25.3 
percent figure is derived from FTC 1944 estate tax returns (Men- 
dershausen  1956). 59  Long-Term Trends in American Wealth Inequality 
ern seaboard,  inequalities at death  would  look  even  greater for  these 
years. On the other hand, both King’s and our procedures for including 
the nonprobated decedents may tend to overstate the wealth inequality 
of decedents. These potential biases make it hazardous to compare these 
size distributions  with ones that attempt  to estimate  wealth  inequality 
among the living. 
The FTC results for 1912 and 1923 can, however, be used to reveal 
the likely net change in net worth inequality between these dates. Table 
1.17 reveals a sharp drop in wealth inequality across World War I, either 
in terms of the top quantile share or in terms of  the Gini coefficient. The 
wealth leveling replicates findings emerging from two other strands  of 
research. First, it appears that World War I was a pronounced leveler of 
incomes and wage ratios (Lindert and Williamson  1976). Second, Stan- 
ley Lebergott’s  (1976) evidence suggests that mobility into and out of 
the ranks of  top wealthholders was great across the same era. World War 
I was a sharp but brief leveler, perhaps because of  its sudden inflation, 
perhaps because of  its effects on labor supply and product demand. 
Wealth inequality trends across the  1920s can be gauged by  the ap- 
plication of  estate multiplier methods to the returns of  the estate tax in- 
itiated in 1916. Robert Lampman (1962) performed that task some time 
ago and his figures (examined in more detail below) show an unmistak- 
able rise in the share held  by the richest between  1922 and 1929. The 
top percentile  share among  all adults rose from  31.6 percent  of  total 
equity in  1922 to 36.3 percent  in  1929. Here again  the top quantile 
measures  of  wealth  inequality display  positive- correlation  with  move- 
ments in income inequality. The 1920s were years in which the top per- 
centile share of income, the ratios of  skilled to unskilled wage rates, and 
the inverse Pareto slope of income inequality among top income groups 
also rose (Lindert and Williamson 1976). 
The period from 1860 to 1929 is thus best described as a high uneven 
plateau of  wealth  inequality. When did wealth  inequality hit its historic 
peak? We do not yet know. We do know that there was a leveling across 
the 1860s. We also know that there was a leveling across the World War 
Table 1.17  Percent Share of  Wealth,  1912-23 
I912  1923 
Williarnson-  Williamson- 
Wealth Class  King  Lindert  King  Lindert 
Top  1%  54.38  56.38  43.10  45.68 
Top  5%  77.69  79.83  70.18  72.44 
Top 10%  88.08  90.03  8 1.24  84.10 
Gini coefficient  ,9186  .9252  .8878  3988 
Source:  Table 1.16. 60  Jeffrey G.  Williamson/Peter H. Lindert 
I decade  (1912-22),  which was  reversed  largely or entirely  by  1929. 
This leaves three likely candidates for the dubious distinction of  being 
the era of  greatest inequality in American personal wealth: ca.  1860, ca. 
1914, and 1929. That each of  these pinnacles was followed by a major 
upheaval-civil  war and slave emancipation, world war, or unparalleled 
depression-suggests  interesting hypotheses regarding the effects of these 
episodic events on wealth inequality  (or perhaps even the impact of  in- 
equality on these episodic events). These cannot be explored here. We 
shall note only that the existence of  a trend in wealth inequality  within 
this period cannot be established, primarily because we lack good  time 
series spanning the four decades from 1870 to the early 19lO~.~~ 
1.4.2  International Comparisons 
The shaky quality of  the available wealth distribution data around the 
turn of  the century makes comparisons between the U.S. and other coun- 
tries hazardous. Yet a rough comparison can at least be suggested, since 
the early years of  this century were ones for which several countries re- 
ported information  on one particular  kind  of  wealth  distribution,  the 
distribution of  wealth among probated decedents. 
The comparison in table 1.18 pivots on the FTC probate distribution 
of  1912, which shows more inequality than any other measurement  of 
wealth dispersion from the entire history of  the U.S. It may be a biased 
indicator but, as we have argued, it is not clear which way the bias runs. 
The FTC probates  understate  inequality  with their underrepresentation 
of  large cities, yet the assumptions used by King and ourselves to include 
nonprobated estates may overstate inequality. With all of  these qualifica- 
tions, it appears that America had joined industrialized Europe in terms 
of  its degree of  reported  wealth inequality. Whatever leveling effect the 
American “frontier” and more rural orientation may have imparted, they 
did not show up in the form of  a clearly lower degree of  wealth inequal- 
ity. By the eve of  World War I, wealth-or at least decedents’ wealth- 
was as unequally distributed here as in Western Europe. Tocqueville was 
right; less than a century after his visit, the American egalitarian dream 
had been completely lost. 
If  further studies confirm this tentative comparison, several corollaries 
demand attention. First, it is important to establish whether differences 
in age distribution and urbanization affect the international comparison. 
Second, was there a stable and high degree of  wealth inequality in West- 
ern Europe that the post-1774 rise in American wealth  inequality  was 
approaching? Or was the trend toward wealth concentration as strong in 
Europe as in the United States across the nineteenth century? Third, who 
migrated, and did their departure from Europe and arrival in America 
serve to raise wealth  inequality on both  sides of  the Atlantic?  Finally, 61  Long-Term Trends in American Wealth Inequality 
Table 1.18  Wealth Shares Held by Top One and Ten Percent of  Decedents 
and the Living: Four Nations, 1907-13 
Wealth Share of 
Country  Top 1%  Top 10% 
Among decedents 
US., 1912: FTC probate sample  56.4%  90.0% 
duty returns for males over 25  64.3  91.9 
U.K., 1907-1 1 : succession 
France, 1909: all probated estates  50.4  81.0 
Among the living 
England and Wales, 1911-13:  persons 
over 25 (estate multiplier method) 
Prussia, 1908: family wealth 
(based on tax assessments)  49.1  82.3 
57.8- 
70.0 
Sources  and  notes: The sources are table 1.17, Willford King (1915, pp.  86-95), 
and  Robert  Lampman  (1962,  pp.  210-15)  citing  an  earlier  study  by  Kathleen 
Langley.  In constructing  the  probate  size  distribution  for  the  United  Kingdom, 
King assumed  that  the estates  in  the  poorest  class  of  men  averaged  60 pounds 
($292) each, and that women owned the same fraction  of  the number and value 
of  estates as in Massachusetts in  1890. It should also be noted that the British  es- 
tate duty returns  are likely to be distorted  by  a peculiar  cause for tax avoidance. 
The British succession duties were  a step function of  total estate, so that the duty 
jumped  by  large numbers  of  pounds  as one’s estate  gained  the extra few pennies 
that put it into a higher  tax  bracket.  Our preliminary  inspection  of  the  summary 
returns published in the Statistical Abstract of  the  United Kingdom suggests that in 
high wealth  brackets  the average  declared  wealth  was  noticeably  above  the mid- 
point,  while  this was not true of  lower  tax  brackets.  This is not the pattern  one 
would expect of  a distribution that rises and then  falls with size. We suspect  that 
rich  heirs prevailed  on themselves  and their  assessors to pull  down  their  taxable 
estate into lower  wealth  brackets, thus understating  British  wealth  inequality. 
King felt that the French returns appeared to list all estates, and left the probate 
tax return distribution unadjusted. He estimated the lower 86 percent of  the Prus- 
sian distribution assuming  “that the curve for small properties  would  resemble in 
form that known to exist for France” (p. 91). 
what became  of  the European-American  comparison following  World 
War I? This last question has already been explored by  Harold Lydall 
and J. B. Lansing (1959), as well as by Robert Lampman  (1962, pp. 
210-15).  They find that the top quantile shares among living wealth- 
holders in England and Wales dropped with each decade from 1911-13 
to midcentury, yet  that wealth  inequality  always remained  more  pro- 
nounced there than in the United States from the  1920s on. Either the 
prewar comparison is misleading,  or the  age  adjustment from the de- 
ceased to the living serves to raise American inequality more markedly, 
or there was  an even more  dramatic leveling of  wealth  in  the United 
States across World War I than the available figures have revealed. This 
issue has yet to be resolved. 62  Jeffrey G.  Williamson/Peter H. Lindert 
1.5  The Twentieth-Century Leveling 
1  S.1  The Post-World  War I Estimates 
Our understanding of levels and trends in wealth inequality since World 
War I rests on two kinds of  data. One source relies on estimates of top 
wealthholder shares using estate tax returns and estate multiplier  meth- 
ods (Lampman 1962;  Smith and Franklin 1974). The other main source 
is the Federal Reserve Board‘s  oft-cited Survey of  Financial Character- 
istics of  Consumers taken on 31 December  1962 (Projector and Weiss 
1966). 
The top quantile shares reported in table  1.19  reveal  unambiguous 
and well-known trends. Top wealthholders increased their share mark- 
edly between  1922 and  1929, apparently  recovering  their  pre-World 
War I shares. Their share then dropped secularly over the next twenty 
years, hitting a trough  around  1949. Thus, the leveling  in wealth  dis- 
tributions after 1929 parallels the “revolutionary” income leveling over 
the same period. Furthermore,  as with incomes the wealth  leveling  is 
not  solely a wartime phenomenon,  since an equally  dramatic  leveling 
took place early in the Great Depression. While this revolutionary change 
in the distribution of  wealth has become a permanent feature of  the mid- 
twentieth century, the postwar period has not recorded any further trend 
toward wealth leveling. 
Table 1.19  Share of  U.S. Personal Wealth Held by Top Wealthholders, 
1922-72 
Percent Share of  Equity (or Net Worth) Held by Richest 
~  ~~ 
1.0 Percent of  0.5 Percent of  1  .O  Percent of 
Adults  Population  Population 
Year  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
1922  31.6  29.8 
1929  36.3  32.4 
1933  28.3  25.2 
1939  30.6  28.0 
1945  23.3  20.9 
1949  20.8  19.3 
1953  24.3  22.7  22.0  27.5 
1954  24.0  22.5 
1956  26.0  25.0 
1958  21.7  26.9 
1962  21.6  27.4 
1965  23.7  29.2 
1969  20.4  25.6 
1972  20.9  26.6 
Sources:  Columns 1 and 2:  Lampman (1962, pp.  202, 204).  Columns  3 and 4: 
Smith and Franklin  ( 1974, and unpublished  estimates). 63  Long-Term Trends in American Wealth Inequality 
1.5.2  Adjustments and Anomalies 
SO say the unadjusted estate tax series. But when these are compared 
with the 1962 Federal Reserve Board survey, the estimates begin to re- 
veal serious gaps. The Fed survey implies that the top  1 percent  of  all 
consumer units held  36.9 percent  of  net worth at the end of  1962. In 
contrast, the top 1 percent of  total population held only 27.4 percent in 
the same year, according to Smith and Franklin. This significant gap must 
be explained. 
Elimination of  the gap between these inequality estimates might well 
begin  with  standardization of  population  units. The Fed  survey  dealt 
with households or, more accurately,  “consumer units.”  The estate tax 
studies could  not  easily  follow the  same  convention,  however.  Given 
data on top individual wealthholders,  they  projected  these top wealth- 
holders onto the total population or the total adult population. Convert- 
ing the estate tax results into a size distribution among households is of 
course impossible in the absence of  data on the wealth of  other family 
members. It is crucial to know, for example, the frequency with which 
male  and female millionaires  estimated  from the decedent  returns  are 
married to each other. If  it is high, then wealth inequality among house- 
holds is greater than that implied by calculations which treat male and 
female millionaires as living in separate households. 
While  point  estimates  of wealth  inequality  among  households  are 
elusive, we can establish ranges. Table 1.20 performs an exercise of this 
sort, accepting the underlying wealth data and converting the top wealth- 
holder aggregates from an individual to a household basis. These esti- 
mates cannot be proved to bound the true top percentile shares, but it is 
our judgment that the truth lies within the range given here. In any case, 
table 1.20  suggests that twentieth-century inequality trends are not much 
affected by converting the top share estimates to a household basis. The 
rise in wealth  concentration between  1922 and  1929 persists,  a some- 
what larger decline from  1929 to midcentury emerges, but the stability 
since the early 1950s remains. 
While the revisions fail to change trends by much, they do add to the 
anomalous discrepancy between the estate tax and the Federal Reserve 
Board survey estimates. It now appears that the top 1 percent of  house- 
holds held only  19.2-21.1  percent of  1962 net worth  according to the 
estate tax estimates, while the 1962 Fed survey reports 36.9 percent. The 
anomaly grows. 
Perhaps the discrepancy lies in different  definitions or measurements 
of  wealth. Yet the two studies seem to have used similar definitions, al- 
though Lampman’s economic estate and Smith and Franklin’s net worth 
are not exactly the same as the Federal Reserve Board’s definition of  net 
worth. 64  Jeffrey G. Williamson/Peter H. Lindert 
Our suspicion turns quite naturally to the way of  reporting wealth to 
the estate tax authorities.  Tax avoidance certainly must be considered, 
since top wealthholders face estate taxes now rising to marginal rates as 
high  as 74 percent.  Perhaps the richest  have simply been much  more 
adept at hiding their wealth from fiscal authorities, and increasingly so 
as the marginal  tax rates rose with  time. Perhaps the Federal  Reserve 




Year  Estimates 
Lampman  Alternative 
Procedure  Procedure 
1922  22.8% 
1929  27.7 
1953  17.65 
1962  19.2 
1969  17.9 




20.4  26.2% 
Sources and notes: The sources are those cited in table 1.19 plus, for the total num- 
ber  of  households, the U.S.  Bureau of  the Census (1976) and Statistical  Abstract 
of  the  United States. 
The low estimates were based on the following definitions: 
Percent of top wealth- -  - 
No. of  individual estates above  $x (among esti- 
No. of  households in the U.S. 
mated  living population)  x 100 
(wealth above $x) 
share of wealth 
- Total value  of  estates  individually  above  $x  Their percent  - 
Wealth of  the entire household sector 
Note that this  low  estimate intentionally  ignores the fact that more  than one per- 
sonal estate can exist in the same household. 
The Lampman procedure  (1962, pp.  204-7)  generates  what  is  probably  a  high 
esfimate of  the  top  wealthholders’ share  by  subtracting  the  number  of  married 
women among individual top wealthholders from the top wealthholder ranks, with 
no other adjustments. This amounts to dividing the husbands with individual estates 
above the top wealthholders’ threshold into two groups. The first group is married 
to wives also having more than the threshold individual wealth.  The second group 
has wives and children with zero personal  wealth. 
The alternative procedure for developing a high esfimate marries all the top wealth- 
holding husbands off  to the richest possible wives and gives them all the children 
with individual estates. That is, this procedure  uses the definitions: 
Percent of top wealth- 
holding households  = 
(wealth above $x) 
No. of  individual estates above $x, excluding all 
wealthholders  under  age  20  and  all married 
women with wealth  above $x  x 100  NO.  of  households in the U.S. 
Total value of estates over $x among adult males, 
adult females not currently married, all minors, 
richest married women equal in number  to the 
x 100  Their percent  -  married  males with estates over  $x 
No. of  households in the U.S.  share of wealth  - 65  Long-Term Trends in American Wealth Inequality 
Board survey of  1962 is correct, and there is much less to the wealth 
leveling since World War I than meets the eye. 
The difficulty with this obvious possibility is that it does not offer a 
clear explanation of  why the Fed survey got such different results.  In- 
heritance tax avoidance by  the rich implies large transfers to heirs inter 
vivos  and  through  trusts,  some  of  which  go  unreported  altogether 
(Lampman 1962; Smith and Franklin 1974;  Mendershausen  1956). But 
in that case, why did they have such a larger share of  total wealth still in 
hand to report to the interviewers in the Fed survey? Alternatively, if  we 
think they are not taking these legal means of  transfering their bequests 
before death, but rather are hiding vast sums from the assessors, why 
would they be so much more candid when  interviewed  by  the Federal 
Reserve in  1962? We can well believe that people might lie to avoid a 
74 percent marginal tax rate, but  it is not yet clear how  or why their 
lying was so inconsistent. There must  be another  explanation  for  the 
discrepancy. 
There are only small gaps between  the amounts of  wealth  reported 
for top wealthholders  to the Fed survey, the Internal Revenue Service, 
and the Smith-Franklin modification of  the IRS data. For either the top 
million wealthholders  or the top two million, the estimated amounts of 
wealth  in  the  Fed  survey  run  something  like  10 percent  above  the 
amounts implied by  the  Smith-Franklin  estimates.  The discrepancy  is 
not large enough to explain the top share gap already  noted. Further- 
more, the same top million or two reported  even more to the IRS itself, 
according to its own estimates  (U.S. Internal  Revenue  Service  1967). 
Differences  in  the  amounts of  wealth  attributed  to top  wealthholders 
apparently do not account for the differences in the 1962  share estimates. 
The key to the 1962 puzzle must lie with competing estimates of the 
total net worth of  the entire personal sector. The Fed survey never  re- 
ported its estimate of  total personal wealth, but the mean net worth and 
and  the  estimated  population  size  imply  an  aggregate  net  worth  of 
$1,198 billion. This is very close to John Kendrick’s  (1976, p. 70) re- 
cent estimate of  the personal sector’s gross assets of  $1,175 billion  for 
the same date. Unfortunately, both figures are well below the $1,779.9 
billion  total  net  worth  used  by  Smith  and  Franklin-and  supplied  to 
them by Helen Stone Tice of the Federal Reserve Board. It appears that 
the Fed survey somehow erred by using a total net worth estimate which 
which is only 56  percent of  the figure later disseminated by the Fed itself. 
A look at Projector and Weiss’s  (1966, pp.  61, 62) technical notes to 
the survey reveals that they were already aware of  a serious underestima- 
tion of  total assets and net worth. If  we conclude that the better estimate 
of  total net worth was that later supplied by the Fed to Smith and Frank- 
lin, then the Fed survey itself implies a top percentile share of  only 20.6 
percent of  net worth, well within the range estimated in table 1.20 above. 66  Jeffrey G.  WiIIiamson/Peter H. Lindert 
If  the estimates are now consistent with each other, they still do not 
reveal what made wealth inequality decline between  1929 and midcen- 
tury. We must take care to subject this  aggregate leveling to the same 
kind of  scrutiny applied to the nineteenth-century  wealth concentration 
trends. In particular, could the leveling be just an artifact of  changes in 
the age distribution? Pursuing this point, table 1.21 displays the percent 
distribution of  male-headed  households by age of  head. Between  1930 
and 1940 or between  1930 and 1960, there was indeed an aging in the 
population  of  male household heads, but it takes a different form from 
that of  the antebellum aging discussed  above in section  1.3. Over the 
nineteenth century, young adult males declined in importance, thus im- 
parting a downward drift to aggregate inequality  indicators as the  age 
distribution compressed. The twentieth-century  experience appears to be 
somewhat different. While young adults  (under 35) decline  in relative 
numbers from the 1920s to the 1960s, adults at the other end of  the age 
distribution increase in relative importance  (aged 55 and above). The 
net life cycle impact on aggregate wealth concentration trends is unclear. 
The issue can be resolved only by applying wealth distributions by age 
to this trending demographic data. The only  distribution data suitable 
for this purpose are those for 1962 reproduced in table 1.22. 
If  we hold both the variance within and the mean values between age 
classes constant at their  1962 magnitudes,  what  would  have been  the 
impact of the changing age  distribution  of  male household  heads  on 
aggregate inequality trends following 1930? The answers appear in table 
1.23. First, and in sharp contrast with  the implications  of  the “Paglin 
debate” (Paglin 1975, and the subsequent exchange in later issues), age- 
life cycle effects appear to be a trivial component of  aggregate wealth 
concentration trends in the mid-twentieth  century. Regardless of  the time 
span selected, Gini coefficients vary  hardly at all in  response to these 
demographic forces.  Second,  the  impact-although  very  small-is  to 
produce increased wealth concentration over time. Thus, it appears that 
Table 1.21  Percent  Distribution of  Male-Headed Households by  Age  of 
Head, 1930-70 
Under  65 and 
Year  35  35-44  45-54  55-64  Over  Total 
1930  27.3  27.1  22.0  14.1  9.3  99.8 
1940  26.3  24.5  22.6  15.3  11.2  99.9 
1950  27.9  24.2  20.3  15.5  12.2  100.1 
1960  25.8  23.9  20.9  15.5  13.8  99.9 
1962  25.3  23.6  20.7  15.6  14.8  100.0 
1970  27.9  20.5  20.7  16.4  14.6  100.1 
Source:  Underlying data taken from various census publications. Table 1.22  Mean Wealth and Percent Wealth Distribution by  Wealth Class, Consumer Unit Heads Classified by Age,  1962 
Neg.  $1  ,OO@  $5,000-  $10,000-  $25,000-  $50,000-  $100,000-  $200,000-  $500,000 
Age  or 0  $1-999  4,999  9,999  24,999  49,999  99,999  199,999  499,999  and over 
Mean Wealth  ($) 
All units  0  396  2721  7267  16,047  35,191  68,980  132,790  300,355  1,260,667 
Under 35  0  41 1  2552  7176  15,493  30,911  75,861  117,437  28 1,433  4,972,437 
1,194,630  3  5-44  0  392  2801  7460  15,897  35,068  68,026  130,385 
45-54  0  392  2801  7460  15,897  35,068  68,026  130,385  294,846  1,194,630 
55-64  0  358  2804  7286  17,056  36,067  68,533  141,236  309,196  1,353,921 
1,034,548  65andover  0  365  2775  6958  15,572  35,131  70,645  122,569  298,141 
294,846 
Percent Wealth  Distribution 
All units  10  16  19  16  23  11  4  1  1 
Under35  14  36  26  14  8  2 
3  5-44  9  14  20  21  25  8  4  1 
45-54  8  10  20  10  31  14  5  1  1 
55-64  9  7  12  16  28  16  8  3  2  1 
65andover  11  8  13  18  25  15  5  1  2 
Sources and notes: Underlying data taken from Projector and Weiss  (1966,  tables  A2 and AS, pp. 98-99  and 110-1  11  1.  Mean  wealth  is 
not reported separately  by  size for age groups  35-44  and 45-54,  but  rather for 35-54.  We have, therefore, assumed the 35-54  mean values 
to apply to both age groups. Furthermore, we set negative  wealth  values at zero, since no alternative was possible. 68  Jeffrey G. Williamson/Peter  H. Lindert 
Table 1.23  Impact of  Changing Age Distribution on Trends in American 
Wealth Concentration, 1930-70:  Projector and Weiss 
1962 Weights 
U.S. Gini Coefficient  U.S. Gini Coefficient 
Male-Headed  Consumer  Male-Headed  Consumer 
Year  Households  Units  Year  Households  Units 
1930  .718  1960  .720 
1940  .719  1962  .719  .76 
1950  .722  1970  .725 
Sources and notes:  Underlying  data are taken  from  tables  1.21  and  1.22.  US. 
male-headed  household  age  distributions  are applied  using  Projector  and  Weiss 
1962 “wealth  distribution  weights” for consumer  units,  applying constant  ( 1962) 
conversion  factors  to get  from male-headed  households  to  consumer  units.  The 
procedure  assumes  the distribution  across wealth  classes within  age groups to be 
constant. We fail to replicate the Projector  and Weiss reported  Gini (1966, table 
8, p. 30) of  .76 since we were forced to set the mean negative wealth class at zero 
and the mean wealth detail in the 35-54  age group is different from Projector and 
Weiss (see note to table  1.21). Thus, our 1962 Gini of  .72 reflects greater equality. 
Presumably, the trends  reported  above are unaffected  by  these assumptions. 
the post-1 929 leveling in wealth distribution is understated, and proper 
adjustment for life cycle effects would serve to make the trend toward 
greater wealth equality even steeper.30 
1.5.3 
Thus far we have  addressed only the size distribution  of  nonhuman 
wealth  (inclusive of  slaveholding), and have ignored total wealth.  The 
latter  augments  “conventional” wealth  by  the capitalization  of  all  ex- 
pected future income streams  accruing from human  capital  as well  as 
claims on retirement income. So  basic an omission is easily justified for 
the nineteenth  century  and earlier, when  human capital was a far less 
important  mode of  accumulation  and  pensions  were  uncommon.  For 
this century, however, we  should at least begin  the task  of  discerning 
what better measures of  total wealth would show, since better measures 
should soon be available. 
Toward Size Distributions of  Total Wealth 
Human Capital 
It is well known that earnings are far more equally distributed  than 
conventional  property  income  or  total  income.  The  implication  for 
wealth distributions is straightforward: total personal wealth must be far 
less concentrated than conventional wealth, and intangible human capital 
must, by inference, be more equally distributed. Frequency distributions 
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and a recent  publication  by  Lee  Lillard  (1977, p.  49)  supplies  more 
specific support. Lillard reports an explicit calculation of  the distribution 
of human capital for a male cohort born between  1917 and 1925. Gini 
coefficients are calculated for the cohort between ages 35 and 44 (e.g., 
over the years  1943 to 1970), taking on an average value of  .45 and 
ranging between .39 and .53. By comparison, Projector and Weiss (1966, 
table 8, p. 30) report a Gini coefficient of  .71 for “conventional”  1962 
wealth in the same age class. What is true for the  age class 35-44  is 
likely to be even more true of  all adult potential wealthholders. 
From the properties of  variance, we also know that the coefficient of 
variation  describing the concentration of  total wealth  (W)  can be de- 
composed into three parts: 
(F)  * = ($)  ‘2 (9)  ‘2  + (;)  * (9)  + 9 
i.e., (1) the coeficient of  variation describing human capital  (H)  con- 
centration weighted by  the share of  human capital in total wealth econ- 
~my-wide;~~  (2) the coefficient of  variation describing conventional cap- 
ital  (C)  concentration, weighted by  the share of  conventional capital in 
total wealth economy-wide;  and (3) a covariance term. It follows that 
total wealth will  become more equally distributed over time for any of 
four reasons, singly or in concert:  (1  ) a leveling in  human capital dis- 
tribution;  (2) a  leveling in  conventional  capital  distribution;  (3)  an 
economy-wide rise in the importance of  human capital in total wealth; 
and  (4) a diminution  in the (presumably positive)  correlation between 
conventional and human wealthholdings. 
Table 1.24 explores the potential impact of  the third item, namely the 
shift in the economy-wide portfolio mix toward human capital following 
1929. For net national wealth held by persons, John Kendrick estimates 
that the intangible human capital share in total wealth rose from 50.3 
percent in 1929 to 58.7 percent in 1969. Based on the tentative estimates 
supplied by Theodore Schultz and Edward Denison, 1929 was a water- 
shed since there is very little evidence supporting a shift in portfolio mix 
prior  to  that data.  Indeed, it  appears  that conventional wealth  was  a 
higher share of  total wealth in 1929 than in  1896. The implication would 
appear to be that the trend toward less concentrated wealth holdings fob 
lowing 1929 is significantly understated by our inattention to this funda- 
mental shift in the wealth portfolio mix during the middle third of  the 
twentieth century.32 
The first-order causes of  the portfolio mix shift following 1929 are not 
hard to find. John Kendrick‘s estimates33 show that net rates of  return 
for human capital have exceeded those for nonhuman  capital over the 
past four decades. Furthermore, there  appears to be considerable  evi- Table 1.24  Composition of  Wealth: Three US.  Estimates, 1896-1973  (percent shares) 
Schultz  Denison-Schultz  Kendrick 
Reproducible  Intangible  Reproducible  Intangible  Tangible 
Human Capital  Nonhuman  Education  Human Capital  Nonhuman  Education  Nonhuman 
Year  Stock  Stock  Stock  Stock  Stock  Stock  Stock 
1896  32.1  67.9 
1899  33.3  66.7 
1900  18.3  81.7 
1909  33.4  66.6 
1910  18.9  81.1 
1914  32.5  67.5 
1919  31.9  68.1 
1920  19.4  80.6 
1929  19.2  80.8  29.8  70.2  42.9  50.3  49.7 
1930  19.7  80.3 
1940  24.7  75.3 
1948  34.3  65.7  45.1  51.7  48.3 
1950  27.0  73.0 
1957  29.6  70.4 
1969  50.5  58.7  41.3 
1973  60.7  39.3 
Sources:  Schulfz: The  education  stock refers  to members  of  the 
labor force with ages over 14. The reproducible nonhuman  wealth 
stock is Raymond W.  Goldsmith’s estimates for the U.S.  economy 
as a whole. Both series are in constant 1956 prices. Schultz (1961, 
table  14, p. 73; and  1963, table 4, p. 51). 
Denison-Schultz:  Denison’s labor  quality  input  index  1896-1948 
is  applied  to  Schultz’s educational  capital  stock  benchmark  for 
1929. Reproducible nonhuman  stock is  private domestic economy 
capital  stock,  Kendrick  (1896-1909)  and  Denison  (1909-48) 
linked. Denison  (1962, tables  11 and  12, pp. 85 and  100). Ken- 
drick (1961, tables A-XV  and A-XXII,  pp. 320-22  and 333).  All 
series in  1929 prices. 
Kendrick:  Net  national  wealth  held  by  persons,  current  dollars. 
Estimates  exclude  intangible  nonhuman  capital  (e.g.,  R&D) and 
tangible  human  capital  (e.g.,  rearing  costs).  Kendrick  (1976, 
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dence that human capital has become less concentrated  since 1929, at 
least based upon earnings distribution data (see Lindert and Williamson 
1976, for a summary of  the evidence). 
This implies that low income and/or younger families have been more 
able to exploit the higher rates of  return to human  capital.  This would 
constitute a mechanism inducing a greater concentration of  capital since 
1929, to the extent that the portfolio  shift to human capital has been 
more pronounced among households with low holdings of  conventional 
wealth.34  We have, then, two reasons for believing that trends in conven- 
tional wealth distributions  understate the  true leveling in  total  wealth 
distributions. 
Social Security and Pensions 
Conventional wealth estimates exclude the present value of  contingent 
claims  to social  security  benefits.  Since  its  introduction in  1937, the 
social  security system has expanded  dramatically. Since wealth  in this 
form has markedly increased in relative importance, and given its more 
equal distribution,  we  have  reason  to expect  that its  exclusion  from 
wealth  concentration statistics tends to create an upward  bias  in total 
wealth inequality trends since the 1920s. Furthermore, if  low and middle 
class  groups have  tended  as  a  result  to shift out of  conventional  ac- 
cumulation much  more dramatically than  the  rich,  then  the measured 
concentration of  “conventional” wealth has an upward bias over time as 
well. 
Martin Feldstein  (1974) has  estimated  that in  1971 social security 
wealth increased wealth of  the entire population by 37 percent net of  the 
present value of  social security taxes paid by those currently in the labor 
force. A similar calculation for 1962 yields an estimate of  31 percent, 
while for those households in which there is a man aged 35-64  the figure 
is 35 percent (Feldstein  1976). James Smith (1974) has estimated that 
pension  fund reserves  amounted  to about 7  percent of  individual  net 
worth in 1962. Not all pension plans are fully funded, of  course, so this 
figure might be viewed as an understatement. Who benefits from pensions 
and social security?  On the face of  it, wealth  held  in  these contingent 
forms must be most  important for middle and low income  individuals 
with little conventional nonhuman wealth except for house equities and 
consumer durable stocks. 
Feldstein  (1976) has made an explicit  calculation of  the impact  of 
social security wealth on the distribution of  total 1962 wealth reported by 
Projector and Weiss. The calculation is based  on the  assumption  that 
social security taxes reduce human wealth but not nonhuman wealth, so 
that his results are gross of  taxes. Feldstein thus estimates (1976, table 2) 
that the share of  the top 1 percent  of  wealthholders  aged  35-64  falls 
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when social security wealth is included. No doubt somewhat less striking 
results would be forthcoming if  the calculation was expanded to include 
all adults, but what does this  9.5 percent difference  suggest regarding 
“conventional”  wealth  concentration  trends  offered  by Lampman and 
Smith and Franklin? As  a share in adult population,  the top 1 percent 
had their share in conventional wealth decline from 3 1.6 percent in 1922 
to 26.0 percent in 1956  (table 1.19). If  the Feldstein  1962 adjustment 
was roughly applicable to 1956 as well, the true decline would have been 
from 31.6 to 16.5 percent,  a leveling in wealthholdings far more con- 
sistent with the observed leveling in incomes.35 
There is,  of  course, an active debate  (Feldstein  1974; Barro 1977; 
Munnell 1976) over the response of  total private saving to the presence 
of  pension  and social security plans,  a  debate which  extends to labor 
supply and the retirement decision. However, no one has challenged the 
view summarized above that these mid-twentieth-century  plans  have in- 
duced a pronounced shift in wealth portfolios in such a fashion that the 
wealth  leveling  as  reflected  in  “conventional”  wealth  measures  is  sig- 
nificantly understated. 
1.6  Overview 
This survey suggests one obvious moral: more data can and should be 
gathered on the size distribution of  wealth throughout American history. 
Unlike data on incomes, the extant wealth data do not improve in quan- 
tity and quality over time. The twentieth-century wealth distributions are 
based on numbers only a little more plentiful and probably more flawed 
than wealth data for earlier centuries. The most critical flaw results from 
the charge of  tax distortion, an alleged distortion unique to the twentieth 
century. To the extent that tax distortions have escalated with the estate 
tax  burden,  we  shall  have  understated  recent  wealth  inequalities  and 
overstated the post-1929 leveling. While the tax distortion problem may 
never be fully resolved, it seems likely that an extension of  our wealth 
accounting to include contingent claims on retirement income and human 
wealth is on the way. 
The available estimates yield more than just  caveats, however.  This 
paper has presented  a tentative  three-century  accounting  starting with 
the mid-seventeenth  century. From that time until the eve of  the Ameri- 
can Revolution, colonial wealth inequality seems to exhibit stability de- 
spite some noteworthy increases in urban wealth  inequality just before 
the Revolution. Between 1774 and the outbreak of  the Civil War, a revo- 
lutionary change took  place  in  the distribution  of  wealth.  Our nation- 
wide estimates point to a near tripling in the ratios of  the average wealth 
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all other groups. Estimates from local probates and tax return  sources 
seem to confirm this dramatic trend toward concentration. Furthermore, 
regional estimates suggest that most of  the  antebellum  shift to wealth 
concentration occurred from the  1820s to the late 184Os, although the 
supply of  such shorter run data is still inadequate. In addition, our calcu- 
lations show that the apparent rise in wealth inequality before the Civil 
War cannot be explained by mere shifts in the age distribution, by the 
increasing share of foreign born, or by urbanization,  although  this last 
item contributes noticeably to the rise of  wealth concentration. 
We  still  know  little  about wealth  inequality  trends  within  the long 
period from the Civil War to World War I. Slave emancipation unam- 
biguously leveled wealth inequality within the South and for the nation 
as a whole across the 1860s. For the half-century  after  1870 we are in 
the dark,  so that we  cannot  with  confidence  identify peak wealth  in- 
equality with 1929, 1914, or 1860. Nevertheless, it is apparent that no 
significant long-term  leveling took place during the period and that in- 
equality persisted at very high levels. 
The twentieth-century figures suggest a clear pattern. Wealth inequal- 
ity, like income inequality, dipped across World  War I and rose across 
the 1920s, although it is hard to say whether the 1929 distribution was 
more or less equal than that of  1912 or some nearby year.  From 1929 
until midcentury, wealth inequality seems to have dropped, again paral- 
leling  the  movement  in  income  inequality.  After  midcentury,  neither 
wealth nor income inequality has shown a trend that can be judged sig- 
nificant on existing data. The American record thus documents a "Kuz- 
nets  inverted-U"  for  both  wealth  and  income  inequality.  Significant 
inequality in  either  form  apparently  did  not  appear  on  the American 
scene until the onset of  modern economic growth in the early nineteenth 
century. 
Throughout the paper we have followed the usual  convention  of ex- 
ploring the size distribution of  nominal wealth. Yet rich and poor con- 
sume different  items  with  their  wealth.  The size  distribution  of  real 
wealth can thus be influenced by movements in the ratio of  the cost-of- 
living index for the rich to the corresponding index for the poor. Else- 
where  (Williamson  1977; Williamson  and Lindert  1978) we have  ex- 
plored the class difference in cost-of-living movements, and have found 
these to have moved in a fashion which serves to reinforce the nominal 
distribution trends. In particular, what we know about class differences 
in  the cost-of-living suggests no revision of  the position that wealth in- 
equality rose before the Civil War. A rise in  the relative  cost-of-living 
for poorer families between  1890 and 1914 adds force to the belief that 
real wealth inequality ascended to a historic peak just before World War 
I. Movements in class cost-of-living indices  also reinforce the nominal 
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To the extent that further research upholds these findings, it will under- 
score the importance of  identifying those forces driving the distribution 
of  wealth in America. An essential first step is to decompose changes in 
aggregate wealth inequality (among persons of  given age) into its four 
components : ( 1  ) changes in the prior inequalities of  bequests inherited 
by the age group, (2) changes in the inequalities of  prior earnings and 
public transfers received by  the age group, (3) changes in the correla- 
tion between  size of  wealth and average propensities to  save in non- 
human form, and (4)  changes in the correlation between size of  wealth 
and rates of  return received on that wealth. This decomposition is preg- 
nant  with  social implications, of  course. Defenders  of  the  American 
record may endeavor to find that shifts in savings propensities explain 
the nineteenth-century rise in wealth inequality, but  not the twentieth- 
century leveling. Critics will feel some compulsion to show the opposite. 
We cannot enter such a debate here, although we  feel that changes in 
the inequalities of  prior incomes will be central to successful explanatory 
models, and that such models will have to deal with the full general equi- 
librium determinants of  quasi-rents on  assets of  all  sorts, human  and 
nonhuman. It should suffice for the present to point out that American 
wealth inequality paints a fascinating picture, one awaiting explanation. 75  Long-Term Trends in American Wealth Inequality 
Appendix  1 Colonial Wealth Inequality Trends 
New  England Colonies 
Table l.A.l  Connecticut: Probate Wealth 
(la)  (1b)  (2a)  (2b)  (3) 
Top 10%  Top 10%  Top 30%  Top 30%  Top 10% 
Hartford  Hartford  Hartford  Hartford  Hartford 
Period  (personal)  (total)  (personal)  (total)  (real) 
1650-69  45.5  47.8  75.0  76.2  53.0 
1670-79  43.0  54.1  68.0  76.7  55.0 
1680-84  I  60.0 
56.4  73.0  1685-89  1  47’0  81.6  I  4810 
52.1  71.0  1690-94  43.0 
1695-99  1 
1700-09  46.0  40.3  72.0  69.4  36.0 
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Source:  Professor Jackson T.  Main has kindly supplied us with these data under- 
lying  his  1976  article  on  Connecticut  wealth.  The  estate  inventory  data,  which 
cover  the great  majority  of  adult  male  decedents  before  the  mid-18th  century, 
have been  age-adjusted to estimate the distribution  of  personal estate, real  estate, 
and total  estate  among  living adult males  whose  estates  were likely to  be  inven- 
toried at death. 
Table 1.A.2  Connecticut and New Hampshire: Unadjusted Probate Wealth, 
Top 30% 
(4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Hartford,  Middle-Sized  Small  Portsmouth, 
Period  Conn.  Towns, Conn.  Towns, Conn.  N.H. 
1700-20  74.03  50.12  65.5 
1720-40  73.02  63.95  75.3 
1740-60  77.27  69.05  60.83  79.7 
1760-76  73.94  69.07  67.50  79.1 
Source  and  nofes:  Unadjusted  probate  wealth,  sampled  counties,  from  Daniels 
(1973-74,  tables 3 and 4, pp.  131-32).  The middle-sized  Connecticut  towns  are 
Danbury, Waterbury, and Windham.  The small Connecticut towns  are the “fron- 
tier  settlements” Canaan, Kent, Salisbury, and Sharon,  all of  which  are in  Litch- 
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Table 1.A.3  Massachusetts: Boston and Suffolk County,  Probate Wealth, 
Top 10% 
(10)  (11) 
(8)  (9)  Suffolk  Top 30% 
Period  Boston  Period  Boston  Period  County  Period  Boston 
1650-64  60.0 
1665-74  64.0 
1685-94  46.0 
1695-04  50.0 
1705-14  56.0 
1715-19  54.0 
1750-54  53.0 
1760-69  53.0 
1782-88  56.0 
1684-99  41.2 
1700-15  54.5 
1716-25  61.7 
1736-45  58.6 
1746-55  55.2 
1756-65  67.5 
1766-75  61.1 
1726-35  65.6 
1695-97  40.6 
1705-06  50.2  1700-20  84.25 
1715-17  36.4 
1726-27  50.8 
1735-37  38.7  1720-40  82.45 
1746-47  50.9 
1755-57  55.7  1740-60  87.94 
1766-67  48.6 
1777-78  41.4  1760-76  85.30 
Sources:  Col.  8:  Wealth inventories of  adult male  decedents, total estate values. 
G. Main  (1976, table IV). 
Col.  9:  Unadjusted  inventoried  personal  wealth  (excluding  real  estate).  Nash 
(1976b, table 3, p. 9). 
Col.  10:  Suffolk County includes Boston. Inventoried  total wealth, unadjusted.  G. 
Warden (1976, table 2, p.  599). 
Col.  11 : Unadjusted  probate wealth,  total  estate  value.  Daniels  ( 1973-74,  table 
2, p.  129). 
Table 1.A.4  Massachusetts: Boston, Tax Lists, Top 10% 
(12)  (13)  (12)  (13) 
Year  “Unadjusted”  “Adjusted”  Year  “Unadjusted”  “Adjusted” 
1681  42.30  1771  63.60  47.50 
1687  46.60  1790  64.70 
Sources and notes:  Taxable  wealth  from  Boston  tax  lists,  augmented  to  include 
adult males without wealth.  The 1687 and 1771 figures in col.  12 are from Hen- 
retta (1965, tables I and 11, p.  185), while the 1790 entry is from Kulikoff  (1971, 
table  2B, p.  381). Gerard Warden has warned that one takes great risks  in trying 
to infer the level and trend of  wealth inequality from Boston’s tax assessments. Un- 
dervaluation  ratios  varied  greatly  over time and across assets, while many  assets 
escaped assessment  altogether.  His  adjustments  for these valuation  and  coverage 
problems are presented in col.  13. G. Warden  (1976, p.  595). 77  Long-Term Trends in American Wealth Inequality 
Table 1.A.5  Massachusetts: Rural Areas, Probate Wealth 
(14)  (15)  (16)  (17)  (18)  (19) 
Top 30%  Top 30%  Top 10%  Top 10%  Top 10% 
Rural  Wor-  Top 10%  Rural  Hamp-  Wor- 
Period  Suffolk  cester  Essex  Period  Suffolk  shire  cester 
1635-60  36.0  1650-64  37.0 
1661-81  49.0  1665-74  37.0  30.0 
1685-94  34.0  37.0 
1695-04  36.0  35.0 
1700-20  62.52  1705-14  33.0  38.0 
1715-19  31.0  52.0 
1720-40  58.01  60.24 
1740-60  67.57  64.42  1750-54  31.0  41.0 
1760-76  68.05  68.06 
1760-69  38.0  39.0 
1782-88  42.4  43.0 
Sources and notes: Cols. 14 and 15: Unadjusted probate wealth, total estate values. 
Daniels  (1973-74,  table 2, p.  129). Rural Suffolk refers to Suffolk County exclud- 
ing Boston, while Worcester refers to the county. 
Col.  16: Unadjusted  total estate values from Koch  (1969, pp.  57-59)  as cited  in 
G. Main  (1976, table I). 
Cols.  17,  18, and  19:  County data where  Suffolk excludes  Boston.  Total estate 
values among adult male decedents reported  in G. Main  (1976, table IV). 
Table l.A.6  Massachusetts: Rural Areas, Hingham Tax Lists 
(20)  (21)  (20)  (21  1 
Year  Toplo%  Top30%  Year  Toplo%  Top30% 
1754  37.44  72.90  1779  46.52  77.58 
1765  40.09  72.40  1790  44.66  74.53 
1772  39.93  71.43 
Sources  and  notes:  Taxable  wealth,  adult  males,  from  Hingham,  Massachusetts, 
tax lists, adjusted to include males without property.  D. Smith  (1973, table  111-1, 
p.  90). Smith also reports  top wealth shares for  1647, 1680, and  1711, but these 
observations are unsuited  for time series analysis.  For justification  of  their  exclu- 
sion see Smith (1973, Appendix tables 111-1  and 111-2)  and Warden (1976, p.  595). 78  Jeffrey G.  Williamson/Peter H. Lindert 
Middle Colonies 
Table 1.A.7  New York and Pennsylvania: Tax Lists 
(22)  (23)  (24)  (25) 
Top 10%  Top 10% 
Chester,  Top 10%  Top 4%  New York 
Year  Pa.  Philadelphia  Philadelphia  City 
1693  23.8 
1695 
1715  25.9 
1730  28.6 
1748  28.7 
1756 




1782  33.6 
1789 
46.0  32.8 
44.5 
43.7 
46.6  34.0 
65.7  49.5 
71.2  54.7 
72.3  55.5 
45.0 
Sources and notes:  Col. 22: Taxable wealth among taxpayers, unadjusted for prop- 
ertyless, Lemon and Nash (1968, table I, p.  11). Lemon  and Nash also report an 
observation for 1800-1802,  but since it includes Delaware County as well, we  ex- 
clude it from the time series. 
Cols. 23 and 24:  Taxable  wealth  among taxpayers,  unadjusted  for propertyless. 
Except for 1772, all observations from Nash (1976b, table 1, p.  6, and table 2, p. 
7). The 1772 figure is from Nash  (1976b, table 2, p.  11). Tax assessment data are 
beset with problems, and Philadelphia is no exception. For example, Nash  (1976b, 
p.  8) notes that the 1756 records omitted all those in the lowest wealth class who, 
nevertheless, would have paid the head tax “ordinarily.”  It is not clear whether the 
same is true of  1693. Furthermore, since the minimum assessment was set at  28 
in  1756, S2  in  1767, and Sl in  1774, there is  an upward  bias  imparted  to the 
inequality trends over time. 
Col. 25:  Taxable wealth among taxpayers, unadjusted for propertyless.  The figure 
for 1730 is from Nash  (1976b, table 1).  The entries for 1695 and  1789 are from 
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Table 1.A.8  Maryland and Pennsylvania: Probate Wealth 
(26)  (27)  (28)  (29  1 
Top 10%  Maryland  Phila-  Top 20% 
Top 10%  Top 10% 
Period  Maryland  (adjusted)  Period  delphia  Period  Chester 
1675-79  49.5 
1680-84  51.0 
1685-89  53.0 
1690-94  55.0  1684-99  36.4 
1700-04  54.7  67.2 
1710-14  66.2 
17  15-1 9  65.5  1716-25  46.8  1714-31  46.41 
1726-35  53.6 
1736-45  51.3  173445  53.02 
1756-65  60.3  1750-70  52.53 
1766-75  69.9 
1695-99  53.0 
1705-09  57.7  1700-15  41.3 
1750-54  65.8  1746-55  70.1 
1782-88  (60.0)  1775-90  60.49 
Soirrces  and  notes:  Cols.  26  and  27:  "Maryland"  is  actually  a  pooling  of  six 
counties:  Anne Arundel,  Baltimore,  Calvert,  Charles,  Kent,  and  Somerset.  The 
1675-1754  observations  are based  on inventoried  adult male wealth, personal  es- 
tate  only.  The  1782-88  observation  is  of  questionable  comparability  since  it  is 
based on taxable  wealth  (real and personal)  distribution  among taxpayers.  Both 
columns are taken from G. Main  (1976, tables A-1  and IV).  Col. 27  reports in- 
ventoried  adult male  personal  estates, adjusted  for underreporting.  Main  also re- 
ports the unadjusted top  10 percent for 1705 to 1754 but since the adjustments are 
so large, no purpose  would  be  served  in  reporting  the  erroneous  figures  beyond 
1704. She does not attempt to adjust the pre-1700  series. 
Col. 28:  Inventoried personal wealth. Nash  (1976b, table 3, p. 9). 
Col. 29:  Chester  County, Pennsylvania,  inventoried  wealth  excluding  land.  Ball 
(1976, table 7, p.  637). 80  Jeffrey G. Williamson/Peter H. Lindert 
Appendix 2 Underlying Data for Colonial Wealth 
Decomposition Analysis 
Table 1.A.9  Average Wealth Benchmarks: Colonial Boston and New 
England 
Boston  1687  I771 
Wealth  S 331,820  E  815,136 
Population  5,925  16,540 
Wealth per capita ( rB)  ;E 56.00  S49.28 
New  England  1680-89 
Wealth  E2,346,858 
Population  67,376 
Wealth per capita (vNE)  S34.83 
Non-Boston  1680-89 
Wealth  E  2,O 15,03  8 
Population  61,451 
Wealth per capita ( FnB)  S  32.79 
1774 






&  36.45 
-- 
-  WB’WNE  1.608  1.339 
WN,/~dw  .941  .990 
U  .088  .027 
Sources:  Boston wealth estimates are based on taxable wealth adjusted by Gerard 
Warden  (1976, pp.  588-89)  for both  undervaluation  and  incomplete  lists.  New 
England  wealth  estimates are based  on probate samples.  The  1680-89  figure  is 
taken from Terry Anderson  (1975, table 9, p.  169), while the 1774 figure is from 
Alice Jones (1972, table 1, p.  102). All  population  estimates are taken  from the 
same sources except Boston’s for 1687. Using Shattuck, Warden reports  the fol- 
lowing  per  annum Boston  averages:  1692-99,  6600, and  1700-09, 7378. Apply- 
ing the  growth  rate  between  1692-99  and  1700-09 backward  to  1687 yields  a 
Boston  population  estimate of  5,925. 
Table 1.A.10  Wealth Held by All Living Potential 
Wealthholders: New England, 1774 
Mean Wealth  Population  - 
Percentiles  Wi  pli 
0-1 0  f  6.30  10 
11-20  15.75  10 
2 1-50  47.25  30 
51-80  134.40.  30 
8 1-90  234.68  10 
91-100  773.33  10 
100  -  All  ;E 157.50 
Gini =  0.62; &/W2  =  ZNE = 1.88 
Source:  Jones 1972, table 6, using assumption A for non- 
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Table l.A.ll  Average Wealth Benchmarks. Phila- 
delphia and the Middle Colonies, 1774 
Wealth per  Inequality 
Capita ( ;E. )  Measure (I) 
Philadelphia  525  2.432 
Middle colonies  377  1.293 
Non-Philadelphia  371  1.193 
Source:  Jones  (1971,  tables  13  and  17), based  on net 
worth  rather  than  physical  wealth,  and  adjusted  to  all 
living  potential  wealthholdings. 
Appendix 3  Top Wealthholder Shares in the Northeast, 
1760-1 891 
Table 1.A.12  Top Decile Shares of  Net Worth 
among A11  Decedents, Massachusetts, 
1829-91 
Year  Share (%)  Year  Share (%) 
1829-3 1  7 1.3-73.1  1879-81  87.2 
1859-61  80.4  1889-9 1  82.5-83.4 
Sources and notes:  The shares of  total  estimated wealth 
held  by  the  richest  decile  of  the  adult  males  dying  in 
Massachusetts in the periods 1829-31,  1859-61,  1879-81, 
and 1889-91  show greater inequality than would the val- 
ues held by  living adult males at any point in time. The 
primary  data on the values of  probated  estates are from 
Massachusetts Bureau of  Statistics of  Labor ( 1895). The 
figures for the latter three periods were adjusted for esti- 
mated  deaths  of  males  without  wealth  and for  assumed 
distributions  of  wealth  among uninventoried  estates  by 
King (1915, tables IX and X and accompanying text). A 
careful scrutiny of  King’s estimates revealed  the specific 
assumptions he made.  These assumptions were not given 
any  careful  justification  but  do  not  seem  implausible. 
King’s assumptions were also applied to the  1829-31  dis- 
tribution of probated wealth. For 1829-31  it was assumed 
that  the total  number  of  adult male  deaths  was  in  the 
same ratio to the adult male population of  Massachusetts 
as in 1859-61, an assumption based on a reading of  Mark 
A. Vinovskis  (1972, pp. 202-13). 82  Jeffrey G. Williamson/Peter H. Lindert 
Table 1.A.13  Top Decile Shares of  Taxable Wealth 
among Taxpayers: Boston, 1771-1845 
Share  Share 
Year  (% 1  Year  (%  1 
1771  63.5  1830  66.2 
1790  64.7  1845  72.9 
1820  50.3 
Sources:  The eighteenth-century estimates are from Ku- 
likoff  (1971, table 11)  and Henretta (1965, tables I and 
11, p.  185). The estimates for 1820, 1830, and 1845 were 
taken  from  Gloria  Main  (1975, table  11).  She  has  re- 
worked  the data  originally  published  in  Pessen  (1973, 
pp. 38-40)  and in Shattuck  (1846, p.  95). 
Table 1.A.14  Top Decile Shares of  Total Wealth 
Inventoried at Death among Adult 
Males: Boston, 1760-1891 
Share  Share 
Year  (%I  Year  (%  1 
1760-69  53.0  1859-61  93.8 
1782-88  56.0  1879-81  83.9 
1829-3 1  83.0  1889-9 1  85.8 
Sources and note:  See Note to table  3.A.1,  above.  The 
figures for 1760-88 are from G.  Main (1975, table IV). 
Those  for 1829-91  are  “adjusted”  and taken  from  the 
same source, table VI. 
Table 1.A.15  Top Decile Shares of  Total Wealth 
Inventoried at Death among Adult 
Males: Rural Suffolk County, 
Massachusetts, 1763-91 
~~ 
Share  Share 
Year  (%  1  Year  (%  1 
1763-69  38.0  1859-6 1  72.9 
1783-88  42.4  1889-91  80.8 
1829-3 1  59.5 
Source:  G. Main  (1975, table IX). 83  Long-Term Trends in American Wealth Inequality 
Table 1.A.16  Top Decile Shares of  Total Taxable 
Wealth  among Property  Taxpayers 
Plus Adult Males with Zero Property: 
Hingham, Massachusetts, 176S1880 
Share 
Year  (%  1 
Share 
Year  (%I 
1765  40.1 
1772  39.9 
1779  46.5 
1790  44.7 
1800  41.9 
1810  39.1 
1820  46.2 
1830  47.0 
1840  51.4 
1850  56.7 
1860  58.8 
1880  57.5 
Source:  Daniel Scott Smith  (1973, table  111-1  and  Ap- 
pendix table 111-2). 
Table 1.A.17  Shares  of  Estimated  Nonbusiness 
Wealth Held by Top 4 Percent of 
“Population”: New York  City, 1828-45 
Share  Share 
Year  (%  Year  (% 
1828  49  1845  66 
Source:  Edward  Pessen  (1973,  tables  3-1  to  3-4,  pp. 
33-37). 
Table 1.A.18  Shares of  Estimated Nonbusiness 
Wealth Held by Top 1 Percent of 
“Population”: Brooklyn, 1810-41 
Share  Share 
Year  (%  1  Year  (% 
1810  22  1841  42 
Source: Edward  Pessen  (1973,  tables  3-1  to  3-4,  pp. 
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Notes 
1. One should resist the meritocratic  temptation to single out nonhuman wealth 
as that part of  total lifetime income or wealth that is of  special interest because it 
it is inherited and not based on individual productivity.  The distribution of  wealth 
is affected by  much  more  than inheritance.  Some people  save a greater share of 
their earnings than others, giving rise to a component  of wealth inequality that is 
less repugnant  to most people than differences in inheritance. The present  data do 
not allow us to separate the effects of differences in saving rates from those of  dif- 
ferences in inheritance. The same mixing of  inheritance with invidual accumulation 
also characterizes human capital and earnings, of  course, since parental wealth and 
abilities are strong determinants  of  human investments. The case for studying  the 
separate distribution  of  nonhuman wealth  is  not based  on its  having  a separate 
welfare meaning, but on its greater accessibility. 
2.  Six years  ago Lee  Soltow  (1971a)  insisted that  inequality  and  wealth  con- 
centration  were high  and stable  during the nineteenth  century,  and that this had 
been  a  relatively  permanent  attribute of  American  experience  before  1776  and 
after. That wealth  inequality  levels were  high  during the  colonial era cannot be 
maintained  on the basis of  the enormous amount of data which  has  accumulated 
since  1971.  (See Jackson Main 11976, p.  541 for a  critical evaluation  of  Soltow’s 
position.) 
3.  The import values  in pounds sterling can be  found in US. Bureau  of  the 
Census  (1976, part 2,  series 2-216,  pp.  1176-77).  Unfortunately, the  series does 
not extend back to the mid-seventeenth  century. For further discussion of  Boston’s 
cycles, see Gary Nash’s  (1976a, pp. 575-76)  account of  wartime  boom,  postwar 
recession and their “disfiguring effect on urban societies.” 
4.  For tobacco prices and exports, see, for example,  Paul Clemens  (1974) and 
Russell Menard (1973). 
5. For example, around  1700, “settled  trading”  towns in Connecticut  had  52.2 
percent  of  wealth in real estate, while for the “new frontier” towns the share was 
62.1 percent  (J. Main  1976, table IX, p. 78). Furthermore, land was the dominant 
asset  in  the  real  estate  total-about  82  percent-if  Hartford, Farmington,  and 
Simsbury in the 1760s are typical  (personal correspondence from Jackson T.  Main 
dated 27 May,  1976). 
6.  Furthermore, concentration  trends in real estate holdings closely follow rates 
of  change in Connecticut relative land values. Taking the ratio of prices of  an acre 
of meadow (J. Main  1976, pp.  101-2)  to farm labor wages  (US. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics  1929, pp.  9,  51, 53 and  124), we  find  the  relative  price  of  land stable 
from the 1680s to 1710. It rises sharply to 1759 and then stabilizes thereafter.  The 
index is 16.67 for 1680-89,  36.30 for 1755-59,  and 44.12  for 1774. 
7.  Log variance is a more commonly used inequality measure. The algebra, and 
the argument, which follow would be exactly the same if  log means  and log var- 
iance were used instead. See Sherman Robinson (1976). 
8.  The reader will note the obvious similarity between this discussion of colonial 
wealth and Simon Kuznets’s (1955) decomposition of income inequality into urban 
and rural components. The same four forces were present in his analysis too:  (1) 
urban inequality,  (2) rural inequality,  (3) urbanization,  and  (4) rural-urban  in- 
come gaps. The framework has been  used  recently  in a wide  variety  of  circum- 
stances. A general statement can be found in Lindert and Williamson  (1976, p.  6) 
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9. That is 






10. Alice Jones’s wealth estimates for 1774 (Jones 1972, table 6, p.  119)  yield 
INE = 1.88. Using top wealthholder share data reported  in table 1.A.1, we estimate 
18 =  2.2 and I.,-R = 1.6. Table 1.1 informs us that Boston’s population  was  about 
3.5 percent of  New England’s in 1760. Appendix 2 supplies the requisite per capita 
wealth ratios for both the early 1770s and the  1680s. This is all the data necessary 
to compute the third term in the expression given in note 9. 
11. In terms of  taxable wealth,  by the middle of  the eighteenth century the top 
10 percent  owned the following shares:  46.6 percent in Philadelphia  (1756); 28.7 
percent in Chester  County, Pennsylvania  (1748). In terms of  inventoried  wealth, 
the  top  10  percent  owned  the  following  shares:  70.1  percent  in  Philadelphia, 
(1746-55); 65.8 percent  in rural Maryland  (1750-1754). These estimates can all 
be  found  in table  1.A.1. Furthermore, Alice  Jones  (1972, tables  13  and 17) has 
documented  net worth shares for 1774; the top  10 percent in Philadelphia  County 
claimed  54.7 percent, while in the Middle colonies as a whole  they  claimed  only 
40.6 percent. 
12. The decomposition formula in note 9 can  be rewritten  where  MC, P,  and 







I,, (7)  w,, 
where  u  is Philadelphia’s  share in total Middle colony population.  Table 1.1  and 
appendix  2  supply  the  wealth  inequality  estimates  for  1774  (IP =  2.432,  l~rc  = 
1.293, and IMP  = 1.193), as well as those for per  capita wealth ratios. 
13. In  contrast  with  Gallman’s  (1974)  cautious  speculations on the  early na- 
tional  period,  some  historians  write  as  if  the  impact  of  age  distribution  on  ag- 
gregate wealth inequality trends was fully understood  for the colonial era. On the 86  Jeffrey G.  Williamson/Peter H. Lindert 
1714-90  period in Chester County, Duane Ball (1976, p.  637)  states:  “[The] dis- 
tribution of  wealth, though seemingly unequal, actually might be considered  fairly 
egalitarian  if  we  were to take the age  of  wealth  holders  into account.  It is  also 
possible  that at least some of the increasing concentration . . ,  is  attributable to a 
change in the age structure, . . . from relatively younger  to relatively  older.”  All 
things are possible, but as far as we know there is no adequate colonial data which 
would allow exploration of the influence of  changing  age distributions. 
14. This is not entirely accurate. Jackson  Main  (1976, table VI, p. 93) reports 
the distribution  of  decedents  by  wealth and age class  for all Connecticut  towns. 
Unfortunately, he pools observations drawn from the century ending  1753, a suffi- 
ciently long period to make age-wealth  analysis tenuous at best. 
15. This sentence is based on an examination of the following age distributions: 
New England, white males, ca.  1690 (Thomas and Anderson  1973, p.  654); West- 
Chester, Bedford, and New Rochelle, New York, adult males and both  sexes,  1698 
(Wells 1975, p. 117); U.S., white and total males, 1800 (U.S. Bureau of  the Census 
1976, part I, p.  16). 
The discussion here is motivated by a different set of  issues than that motivating 
Jackson  T. Main’s recent  analysis of  Connecticut  eighteenth-century probates.  He 
devotes considerable  attention to the  impact of  age on wealth  distribution  from 
region to region and across occupations, but never across time. See J. Main  (1976, 
pp. 77-97). 
16. Jackson  Main  (1976, p.  61) thinks it could,  at least  based  on Connecticut 
evidence:  “Historians  seem to have neglected  this life-cycle. They have  lamented 
a high proportion of  nearly propertyless polls appearing on tax lists  . . . without 
perceiving that most of  these were just entering manhood.” 
17. Take the case of  Boston. Rapid growth early in the eighteenth century would 
imply  a rise  in  the share of  young  adults in  the adult population,  increased  age 
dispersion  and,  given  in  addition  migration  selectivity,  an  inequality  bias.  We 
should  count  more  poor,  the percent  on  relief  should  have  risen,  and  probate 
records  along with  tax lists  should  produce  rising  concentration  ratios.  The OP- 
posite  should  have  been  true  following  the  1730s  when  young  people  (without 
much wealth)  must  have fled  Boston’s stagnating  economy.  The  Boston  probate 
records document historical concentration  trends which  may be explained  at least 
in part by these  (alleged) age distribution  changes.  That is, some portion of the 
inequality  trend  from  1700 to  1730  (figure  1.3) must  be  accounted  for by  the 
presumed rise in the young adult share. 
18. These dramatic trends  can also  be  seen  in  shifts  in  the ratios  of  average 
wealth  at the top to average  wealth economy-wide.  Between  1774 and  1860 the 
ratio of  the average wealth of  the top  1 percent  of  wealthholders  to the average 
wealth of  the lower 99 percent  rose from 14.0 to 40.4. Over the same period, the 
ratio of  the top decile’s average wealth to that of  the bottom 90 percent rose from 
8.54 to 24.3. Both ratios  nearly tripled. 
19. We  had hoped  to perform  the  same experiments,  including  a  test  for  na- 
tivity  effects,  on Professor  Soltow’s  1860  spin  sample,  but  this  sample  was  not 
available to us at the time of  writing. 
20.  Actually,  Professor  Jones applies  the  1800  age  distribution  to  the  1774 
wealth data. 
21.  The skimpy data on age distribution before  1830 suggest that this date may 
have  been  a watershed  in the share of  young  adults in  the  adult population,  as 
well  as  in  the wealth distribution  trends discussed in  section  1.3.6 below.  Table 
1.6 shows a rise in the share of  persons aged  16-25  in the total population  aged 
15  and over between  1800 and 1820. By  itself, this shift would  impart an upward 87  Long-Term Trends in American Wealth Inequality 
bias to aggregate inequality trends for the first two decades of the nineteenth cen- 
tury.  This would  reinforce  the  case  for dating  the  rise  of  wealth  concentration 
among fixed demographic groups from around the  1820s. It is after this date that 
we  observe the aging referred  to in the text. 
22. Since this result  is  so striking,  we  performed  another  calculation using  the 
adult  (male and female) age distributions  in  the Northeast reported  in table  1.6 
and Soltow’s 1870 income  X  age profile guesstimates  (1975, table 3.7, p. 90). The 
results are similar. The top 10 percent of  adult income earners would  have found 
their  share of total  income declining from  16 percent  in  1830 to  12.5 percent  in 
1870, were no other inequality forces at work. Robert Gallman (1974, p. 7) found 
similar results using a different age  X  income profile. He argued  that the top 30 
percent  share in  total  income would  have declined  from 95.9 percent  in  1830  to 
92.0 percent in 1860, a result almost identical to ours. Gallman did not pursue the 
implication  of  this calculation  for interpretations  of  nineteenth-century  American 
inequality  trends. His  interest  was primarily  in  the comparison  between  America 
and Europe. 
23. For  adult males  in  1870, the  US.  Gini coefficients based  on total  estates 
were .831 for native born and .840 for foreign born. For free adult males in  1860, 
the  US. Gini coefficients based  on  total  estates  were  .816  for  native  born  and 
.858 for foreign born. Soltow  (1975, pp.  107 and 145). For adult  males  in  1850, 
the Wisconsin  Gini coefficients based  on real  estates  were  .746  for native  born 
and  .786 for foreign born. Soltow (1971b, p. 81). 
24.  This state of  affairs  need  not  continue.  For the  1850s,  more  can  be  done 
from the  manuscript  federal  and state  census  returns  on real  estate  value,  farm 
acreage, and farm implements, either with the Bateman-Foust and Soltow samples, 
or with new samples. Local tax  returns can also be  exploited more fully.  In addi- 
tion, Gallman’s procedure of  tracking  down the  wealth  of  the richest  individuals 
for comparison with  rough wealth  aggregates can be  extended to other dates and 
to regions. Above all, as we shall mention in the text, the vast numbers of  probate 
inventories,  many  of them  collected and referenced  in the Library  of  the  Genea- 
logical Society of  the Church of  Jesus  Christ  of  Latter-Day  Saints near Salt Lake 
City, promise better perspectives on wealth distributions  from the  colonial period 
until the onset of  estate tax returns in the 1920s. 
25.  It would be  interesting to explore the extent  to which  the rise in urban  in- 
equality  was  due to the  influx of  immigrants  from other countries and from the 
U.S. countryside, thus  paralleling the experiments we  performed  on the “foreign- 
born  myth”  at the  national  level.  The  data for doing  so  were not  available  at 
time of  writing, however. 
26. Lampman’s  modern  estimates for  1922 are to be preferred,  of  course, but 
King  (1927, p.  152)  estimated a  wealth distribution  for 1921  from which  it can 
be inferred that the top 1.4 percent of  persons held  31.51 percent of  total wealth. 
Lampman and King are remarkably close, it seems to us, and either estimate for 
the early 1920s implies the same mild upward drift in concentration following  1890. 
27. Professor Lampman (1959, p. 388, note 14) was apparently in error when he 
rejected  Holmes’s estimate of the  1890 wealth  concentration  with  the  statement: 
“It is difficult to believe that wealth was actually that highly concentrated  in  1890 
in  view  of  the  1921  and  1922 measures.”  This statement  is  apparently  based  on 
the mistaken  impression that Spahr’s (1896) allegation that the top 1 percent held 
51 percent of  1890 wealth could be attributed  to Holmes as well. On the contrary, 
Holmes’s results are quite  in line with  Lampman’s estimates. 
28.  In  addition, the FTC sampled 540 estates of  $1 million and over from New 
York, Philadelphia, and Chicago for  1918-23,  using the earliest estate tax returns. 88  Jeffrey G. Williamson/Peter H. Lindert 
The data worksheets underlying the entire  FTC income  and wealth  study  are 
currently available in the Washington National Records Center in  Suitland, Mary- 
land. The 1912-23  probate sample has the file designation Tab 5  Cou 5. Our col- 
league Victor  Goldberg has kindly sampled these files for us and reports that the 
counties sent varying  details back  to the FTC.  While  they  all provided  the  size 
distributions the Commission requested, they did not provide the individual wealth 
data in all cases, and apparently there is no consistency  in the degree of  further 
detail volunteered  by the county officers. Some gave  the names of  the decedents, 
some broke down wealth into asset categories, and so forth. 
Scholars in serious pursuit of  further historical wealth data should also consider 
two other potential  sources in addition  to the FTC data files. One is the Compo- 
sition of Estates Survey of  about 100,000 probated  estates, collected by  the WPA, 
but not analyzed  by  them because  federal funds ran out (Mendershausen  1956, 
p.  279n). The other is an unsampled  set of  files at the National Bureau  in New 
York marked  ‘W. I.  King data files,” the existence of  which  was kindly  reported 
to us by Geoffrey H. Moore of  the Bureau. 
29.  We have  a few time  series of  more  limited scope,  and they  also  give con- 
flicting indications of  trends across the late nineteenth  century. The suggestion of 
a  gentle rise  in  wealth inequality  planted  by  Gallman’s top 0.031  percent  shares 
receives  some slight support from the gentle rises in  the Gini coefficients for In- 
diana real estate  appraisals for  1870-1900  and for U.S.  real estate  mortgage  val- 
ues  for  1880-89.  On  the other  hand, Massachusetts  probate and  tax  series fail 
to agree on any trend  after 1860, and Soltow feels that wealth  inequality  in Wis- 
consin  showed  a  net  decline  between  1860 and  1900  (1971b,  pp.  11,  12). We 
cannot identify any trends between  1870 and World War I, either  in these limited 
series or in the national wealth distributions available. 
30.  Using T. Paul Schultz’s  (1971)  data on the log  variance of  1950 incomes 
by  age classes  (males,  aged  20  and  above), we  also computed  the  effect  of  the 
1930-50  age distribution  shift on  income inequality. Whether  one excludes  those 
under 25, over 65, or both, the effect of  age distribution changes is to raise income 
inequality.  We  conclude that the  observed  post-1929  equalization  tends  to under- 
state the equalization of  both life cycle income and wealth. 
31.  We are considering the total population of  potential wealthholders, not those 
at or in  retirement.  If  the  latter  age  class  were  the  sole  focus,  human  capital 
would,  of  course, be irrelevant. 
32.  All  of  this  assumes,  of  course,  that  human  and  conventional  capital  are 
equally fungible  and perfect substitutes so that dollar values of  both may be  ag- 
gregated without  further  adjustment.  Readers  may wish  to quarrel with  that  as- 
sumption. 
33.  While  net  rates  of  return for human  and  nonhuman wealth  were  roughly 
identical  in  1929, the  rates  (with  the  sole  exception  of  1948) have  diverged  in 
favor of  human capital since. The figures are reproduced  below  (Kendrick  1976, 
p. 240;  1974, p. 465): 
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Elsewhere we  have  attempted  to model  the determinants  of  these  rates  of  return 
(Williamson and Lindert  1978) and thus to emerge with a full analytical account- 
ing of American  twentieth-century distribution experience. 
34.  This argument  implies that the covariance between  human  and nonhuman 
wealth holdings has weakened since  1929. 
35. While  Peter  Drucker  (1976,  p.  12) and others have  guessed  that  the  in- 
clusion of pension plans would result in a “distribution of  total wealth [that] would 
probably turn out to be be very similar to .  . .  the distribution of  personal income,” 
no one to our knowledge has attempted for pensions a calculation like Feldstein’s 
for  social  security.  In any  case,  it  is  not  clear  how  such  an  accounting  would 
affect the post-1929  trends  in  income and wealth  distribution.  Lampman’s  (1962, 
table  97,  p.  209)  total  wealth  variant, upon  which  the  trends  in  top  shares  are 
based, includes reserves of  private pensions, although the  1962 Projector and Weiss 
estimates do not. 
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